Why Share?
An Analysis of the Sources of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing

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Date: January 22, 2020

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Abstract

Why do former belligerents institutionalize power-sharing arrangements after a civil war ends? This article argues that elites create power-sharing institutions when the most significant threat to their political power comes from an outside group as opposed to from within their own group. That is, forward-looking and power-minded leaders of former belligerents push for the type of power-sharing at the negotiating table that affords them the greatest opportunity to influence country-level politics after the conflict has concluded in full. For elites facing competition from outside, this means securing power-sharing through institutional rules and guidelines in the settlement of the civil war to ensure that they are included in the governance of the state. By contrast, for elites fearing in-group rivals, complex governance institutions are at best unnecessary and, at worst, a significant concession to weaker opponents. I test the argument with a cross-national analysis of an original dataset of 186 power-sharing negotiations from 1945-2011. The empirical analysis suggests that elites are most likely to institutionalize power-sharing when no single ethnic group dominates politics and when most ethnic groups are unified. The quantitative analysis is complemented with illustrative examples from cases of power-sharing negotiations that offer insight into the proposed theoretical mechanisms.

Introduction

A vast literature has investigated the connection between power-sharing institutions and intrastate conflict, arguing that power-sharing decreases (Cederman et al. 2013), increases (Roeder 2005; Sriram 2008), or has no effect on the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Moreover, power-sharing is now the international community's default negotiated solution for nearly all civil wars in which there is not total military victory by one side.Indeed, the idea that former enemies should come together to share power now pervades academic and policy writings as well as post-conflict practice from Angola right after the Cold War to Libya more than two decades later. However, relatively little is known about why former belligerents choose to share power following peace negotiations and why some parties seek institutional power-sharing guarantees during negotiations while others rely on electoral results alone to form governing coalitions. Existing scholarship emphasizes the nature of the conflict preceding negotiations, international actors, or state institutional capacity as critical factors for determining whether former belligerents will agree to share power or not (Zartman 1993; Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Yet these accounts overlook the importance of political considerations *between* and *within* ethnic groups.

I argue that former belligerents choose to institutionalize power-sharing depending on the source of their principal political competition. If the leaders of an ethnic group fear losing state-wide elections to out-group competition, they are more likely to push for some form of institutional guarantee at the negotiating table. However, if the leadership of an ethnic group is divided into factions, each faction might fear losing power to in-group rivals in a contest to fill an ethnic quota under an institutional power-sharing arrangement. In this scenario, elites from divided ethnic groups will avoid institutionalized political power-sharing, preferring to form coalitions through electoral results or non-political forms of power-sharing.

The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, I develop a novel theoretical framework

that explicitly models the choice of power-sharing institutions and tests the implications of the theory with an original dataset on power-sharing orders. In particular, I distinguish between proportional power-sharing, which allows former belligerents to share power on the basis of electoral results, and institutional power-sharing, which formally codifies power-sharing rules in a peace agreement. Second, this paper unpacks the unitary actor assumption inherent in much of the power-sharing literature to show that ethnic groups are often represented by different factions at the negotiating table. Existing research has shown that leaders make wartime calculations about potential in-group and out-group competitors that may affect the onset of conflict (Cunningham 2013), the duration of conflict (Metternich 2011; Cunningham 2011), violence against the state and civilians (Cunningham et al. 2012), and alliance configurations during the civil war (Christia 2012). This paper contends that ethnic group leaders continue to make political calculations based on internal divisions after a conflict ends, influencing their choice of power-sharing institutions.

The empirical analysis yields three sets of findings. First, belligerents are highly unlikely to agree to institutional power-sharing in societies with a dominant majority ethnic group. Moreover, the likelihood of institutional power-sharing is inversely proportional to the size of the largest group, suggesting that dominant groups have little incentive to concede political power in institutional form at the negotiating table. Second, the probability of institutional power-sharing increases when ethnic groups are unified rather than divided. Third, the probability of institutional power-sharing increases in the presence of UN peacekeepers regardless of mandate, suggesting that international actors support power-sharing through the provision of information about the size and fractionalization of ethnic groups rather than enforcement.

These results are important for two reasons. First, the choice of power-sharing institutions shapes the foundation of governance institutions and political orders in many post-conflict settings. Scholars have conjectured that the power-sharing institutionalization process may

affect rates of conflict recurrence, long-term trust-building, and good governance (Sisk 1996; Lemarchand 2006; Jarstad 2008; Daly 2014). Consequences can also be more subtle. For example, the rigid institutional power-sharing system in Lebanon eventually buckled after the changing demographics of the state rendered the constitution obsolete. However, the lack of an institutional process for power-sharing prevented a government from forming in Iraq for more than eight months following the March 2010 elections. A better understanding of how belligerents come to choose institutionalized forms of power-sharing would thus help us explain how belligerents come to make a seemingly simple institutional choice that may have immense consequences for peace and governance. Second, disaggregating power-sharing into separate types of orders (proportional and institutional) and understanding the determinants of those orders can also account for conflicting results about the effectiveness of power-sharing. For instance, a theorized association between conflict and a type of power-sharing may be endogenous to a confounding variable that explains the onset of both. Tracing the origins of power-sharing orders can help identify potential confounders, improving causal inferences about power-sharing.

Power-Sharing after Conflict

When a single belligerent has not emerged clearly victorious after an ethnic conflict, the warring parties will attempt at one point or another to negotiate a peaceful end to the fighting. During negotiations, the sides engage in explicit or implicit bargaining over the shape of the post-conflict institutional order (Gent 2011) and the extent to which the sides will share power. Yet, there exists little agreement among scholars on the precise definition of power-sharing (Binningsbø 2013). I define post-conflict power-sharing as a political arrangement following the end of a civil war according to which former combatants agree

to share executive policy-making responsibilities at the state-level.[1] I distinguish between *institutional* and *proportional* power-sharing arrangements.

I define *institutional power-sharing* as any regime in which each of the major former combatants of the civil war possesses the ability to veto state policy through the mutual holding of executive offices. As long as one group can veto the actions of the other or others through partial control of executive policy-making, one can say with confidence that power in the state is shared in a meaningful way (Tsebelis 2002). The mutual veto can be an explicit agreement or an informal understanding that inevitably arises from the institutional arrangement. In this way, I adhere closely to Arend Lijphart's original formulation, which specifies that "the mutual veto can be an informal or unwritten understanding or a rule that is formally agreed on and possibly anchored in the constitution (1977, p. 38)." However, my use of mutual veto in this context diverges from some contemporary analyses of power-sharing. It differs, for example, from Strøm et al. (2017), who code the mutual veto solely as an explicit (formal) institutional feature of certain power-sharing regimes.

Whereas institutional power-sharing formalizes the distribution of political power between ethnic groups, other power-sharing arrangements do not explicitly codify sharing to the same extent. Under *proportional power-sharing*, a state holds elections and governments form on the basis of the election results. These regimes almost always have quotas for ethnic groups in the legislature, typically to ensure that election results reflect some demographic balance and groups are not excluded from political power. In other cases, there are quotas for ministry positions in a shared government, though all groups are not guaranteed the ability to veto policies made by the chief executive. As a result, "grand coalitions" and "unity governments" in which many groups form a governments are the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, elections are held with the expectation that such governance will emerge.

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[1] I focus on post-conflict settings, excluding states such as the Netherlands, which has had power-sharing independently of ethnic conflict.

Such governments may emerge in states without power-sharing as well but this is usually due to the circumstances of a particular election rather than a particular feature of the political system.

Both types of power-sharing offer groups some measure of political representation but differ in the degree to which elections shape the selection of membership of the executive. With institutional power-sharing, the allocation of executive power between groups is determined independently of an election event and the negotiated settlement guarantees each belligerent a share of the power formally by constitutional design. Furthermore, members of each ethnic group are guaranteed positions in the new government that can veto the policies of the other representatives. Political officials are chosen through group-based elections in which ethnic groups select their representatives to state-level institutions. By contrast, proportional power-sharing regimes rely upon electoral results to establish the distribution of power in legislatures that in turn select the executive. As a result, not all ethnic groups may be able to veto policies made by the executive.

These types of power-sharing are explicitly political, excluding other elements of power-sharing, namely territorial, economic, and military power-sharing (Walter 2002; Mukherjee 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). For instance, my conceptualization of power-sharing does not include the creation of the Mozambican Defense Force (FADM) in the General Peace Agreement at the conclusion of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992, which would permit the sharing of military power between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the two belligerent sides in the conflict.

Hypotheses

Why do some elites institutionalize power-sharing while others remain content to share power through electoral coalitions? My answer is that forward-looking and power-minded leaders

of former belligerents push for the type of power-sharing at the negotiating table that affords them the greatest opportunity to influence state-level politics after the conflict has concluded in full.

I advance two sets of arguments. First, when a leader's ethnic group is unified, they push for institutional power-sharing unless that leader's group is in the majority. When unified, the primary political competition that that leader will face after the war formally concludes comes from out-group sources. And so, fearing that defeat at the ballot box from out-group leaders would lead to their exclusion entirely from the governance of the state, these leaders work to incorporate institutional guarantees at the negotiating table when a civil war ends. The only exception is when, as mentioned, the leader's ethnic group is in the majority, in which case non-institutional forms of power-sharing will guarantee that her group will disproportionately influence state-level politics.

Second, when a leader's ethnic group is not unified and several in-group rivals exist, then each of that group's leaders will push for an electoral power-sharing solution. Under this scenario, institutional power-sharing potentially locks some group leaders out of power. Guarantees mean that one leader can edge out other leaders. Electoral solutions are not ideal since the out-group might win the election, gaining the most seats. However, they are preferred to institutionalized power-sharing arrangements since a leader might still be able to gain influence as a member of a coalition government with the out-group politicians or with both out-group leaders as well as in-group rivals.

The vast majority of existing research on post-conflict power-sharing focuses on the effect of power-sharing on the likelihood of conflict recurrence.Some proponents of power-sharing argue that it is an effective strategy for minority inclusion that mitigates grievance motivations for conflict (Mukherjee 2006; Cederman et al. 2013; Graham et al. 2017). Others suggest that power-sharing helps belligerent commit credibly to peace (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009). However, some scholars are less optimistic, ar-

guing that power-sharing hardens existing cleavages and thereby increases the risk of conflict recurrence (Roeder 2005; Sriram 2008). Moreover, the success of elite-level power-sharing may incentivize other local actors to commit violence as a means to gain power (Tull and Mehler 2005; Daly 2014).

Scholars have has offered several explanations for why some belligerents choose to share power when others done. Some researchers argue that weak rebels can incentivize governments to share power as means to reduce civilian support and end a rebellion (Mukherjee 2006). However, weak rebels with less to lose might also be less likely to accept concessions (Gent 2011). Other scholars focus on the idea "mutually hurting stalemate—the idea that parties are likeliest to agree to a negotiated solution when all parties perceive themselves deadlocked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory (1993). However, the empirical evidence for these claims is mixed (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). A third set of explanations finds that a state's capacity for accommodating grievances through institutional channels explains whether a government will share power with rebels after conflict (Hartzell 2014).

Existing work suffers from two primary short-comings. First, it does not distinguish between different types of political power-sharing institutions. Political power-sharing takes different forms, each with unique incentives for the involved parties. Second, power-sharing research frequently treats negotiating parties as unitary actors. Yet this does not reflect the complex, fragmented dynamics that underlie conflict and post-conflict settings (Cunningham et al. 2012).

Divisions within Ethnic Groups

Post-conflict states contain ethnic groups that themselves have divisions, typically manifesting along three dimensions (Bakke et al. 2012). First, rebel groups and governments representing ethnic groups contain different organizations or "wings" (e.g., political or mili-

tary). Second, ethnic group organizations can be more or less institutionalized, with varying degrees of rule-based procedures for engaging different leaders and factions (Staniland 2014). Third, there exists a distribution of power between factions within an ethnic group, with some stronger than others. As long as factions exist at the time of negotiation, elites must be mindful of all potential rivals, no matter how small, since such rivals can eventually rise to power. Consider the fate of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah). At the start of the Palestinian independence movement in the early 1960s, Fatah had only a few hundred members. By the signing of the 1994 Oslo Peace Accords, Fatah had become the dominant Palestinian faction. In the 2000s, this dominance gave way to the rising Hamas, culminating in the defeat of Fatah in the 2006 legislative elections (Krause 2014).[2]

Leaders prefer that their faction is alone in power since this affords them the greatest amount of influence over post-conflict politics and, as a result, the greatest likelihood to craft policy in line with their interests. As was the case with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, which drew chiefly from the Ovimbundu ethnic group, during Angola's power-sharing negotiations in the 1990s, a faction may serve as the main representative from an ethnic group. Or, as was the case with both Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, an ethnic group may have several factions.

If sole governance by a faction proves politically unfeasible, leaders prefer intraethnic power-sharing in which they can govern alongside other factions from the same ethnic group. In this case, leaders may not be able to pass their factions' most preferred policies but, at the very least, they will be able to make policy preferred by their ethnic group, albeit with some disagreements between factions. For example, while leaders of Mali's different Tuareg rebel factions may disagree about their desire to create a separate Tuareg state (known as "Azawad"), they agree in their desire for greater autonomy from the Mande-dominated central government in Bamako.

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[2]Nonetheless, I do acknowledge that the treatment of all factions as equally important is a limitation of the research design since all factions may not be substantively equal in practice.

When intraethnic power-sharing is unrealistic and the alternative is to be left out of power entirely, leaders of ethnic factions will accept interethnic power-sharing. However, even under these circumstances, they prefer a greater share of power and as few partners as possible. This explains the political calculus behind Bosnian Croat leaders at the Dayton Peace Accord negotiations who wanted to ensure an equal share—alongside Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs—of executive power despite a substantially smaller share of the population.

Power-Sharing Negotiations are Strategic

The decision to institutionalize comes about from a negotiation between the leadership of multiple parties, each of which is attempting to maximize its utility relative to its rank-ordered preferences of power-sharing. Because the relative size of the population matters for negotiations, I distinguish between cases in which the largest ethnic group is in the majority (i.e., population greater than 50%) and those where it is not. Divisions within ethnic groups become salient when the largest group is not in the majority. Table I summarizes the expectation of all of these scenarios.

[**Table I about here**]

When there is a majority present, intraethnic divisions are unlikely to factor into negotiations. If the majority is unified, it will push for proportional power-sharing or no institutional power-sharing at all since these arrangements would allow them to either exclude the minority group entirely or gain a bigger share of the power-sharing partnership. Consider the lack of incentives for the dominant Israeli Jewish majority to agree to institutional power-sharing within the Israeli state since the early 1990s. The Jewish majority is reticent to make institutional governing concessions to the Palestinian minority. Because they are able to win elections and dominate governance, there is no incentive for Israeli elites to give up guaranteed shares of power to the minority (O'Leary 2016).

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When the majority group is internally divided, it faces a tough decision. If the minority group is strong enough, they might be able to secure the most votes in an election, leaving them in a potential advantageous position vis-a-vis the fractionalized majority group. Thus, a leader from a divided majority ethnic group would prefer proportional power-sharing or no power-sharing over institutional power-sharing for two reasons. First, institutional power-sharing might mean that they would lose the election in their ethnic group and thus not partake in governance at all. Governing alongside a stronger out-group partner is still preferable to not governing at all. Second, elections might give another ethnic group the plurality of the votes but the majority ethnic group, even divided into multiple factions, would hold the majority of votes and thus could still play an outsized role in governance.

Minority ethnic groups might push for institutional power-sharing since they fear political competition from the majority group. However, they are unlikely to get their way, given that there is no incentive for majority groups to concede to institutional guarantees. To get these groups to agree, the majority might offer other forms of power-sharing guarantees (e.g., military or territorial power-sharing) but they will feel no need to concede on political power-sharing. For example, the central Malian government did not make major political concessions in the form of institutional power-sharing in its negotiations with Tuareg rebels in 1991 and 1992. However, it instead offered territorial power-sharing and military power-sharing to bring the Tuareg rebel leaders to negotiating table (Wing 2008).

In all of these scenarios, the mere presence of a majority group is likely to decrease the likelihood that the groups agree to an institutional power-sharing solutions.

Hypothesis 1 *The probability of institutional power-sharing is negatively associated with the presence of a majority ethnic group.*

It is possible yet unlikely that institutional power-sharing emerges when there is a majority group present in a country. Moreover, it becomes increasingly more unlikely the more

populous and powerful the majority group is. This relationship holds when the largest group is only in plurality as well. Larger groups, which are close to a majority, are less likely to push for institutionalized power-sharing than comparatively smaller groups. Additionally, it becomes increasingly more likely that the largest group will get its way the larger it is (Ariotti and Golder 2018).

Hypothesis 2 *The probability of institutional power-sharing is negatively associated with the size of a the largest ethnic group.*

Divisions within ethnic groups become salient in the absence of a dominant majority group. If all or the majority of groups have unified leaderships, these groups will push for institutional power-sharing. These groups fear out-group competitors in an electoral setting. Under non-institutionalized power-sharing arrangements, a configuration of opponents from other ethnic groups could come together in a post-electoral coalition and exclude them from governance. And so, fearing potential exclusion from governance, all groups will make concessions in the form of institutional guarantees to share power. As an example, consider negotiations in the early 1990s in Afghanistan between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who represented the Hezb-e Islami mujahideen, and and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of Jamayat-E-Islami. Whereas Hezb-e Islami drew primarily from Pashtuns, Jamayat-E-Islami recruited primarily from Tajiks. Over the course of three agreements—the 1993 Islamabad Accord, the 1993 Jalalabad Accord, and the 1996 Mahipar Agreement—Hekmatyar and Rabbani agreed to institutionalize power-sharing. For Hekmatyar, who could count on the support of Pashtuns that numbered about 40% of the Afghan population, this assured that he could prevent a coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara that would exclude him from power. For Rabbani, institutional power-sharing allowed him to be a part of the government. Any other arrangements might have excluded him entirely from power (Maley 2009).

When all or the majority of ethnic groups are divided then the divided groups will prefer not to institutionalize power-sharing. The problem with institutional power-sharing

is that leaders of factions might lose the selection contests to become their ethnic group's representatives to state-level political office. In this case they would be excluded from power entirely. However, proportional power-sharing or no power-sharing at all mean that factions of an ethnic group can gain influence via an electoral solution, albeit a potentially small share of power. For this reason, they will prefer electoral power-sharing.

Hypothesis 3 *Absent a majority group, the likelihood of institutional power-sharing is positively associated with the majority of ethnic groups being unified.*

International Factors

Institutional power-sharing requires all parties to commit to participation in a joint government with their former adversaries before any elections are held. Since belligerents struggle to make such commitments credible, scholars have suggested that international actors can help through the provision of information about potential defections and enforcement of violations of the agreement (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). The implication is that leaders of ethnic groups will not agree to institutional power-sharing unless an international peacekeeping operational with a robust mandate capable of enforcing defections from the power-sharing agreement is present.

Hypothesis 4 *The probability of institutional power-sharing is positively associated with the presence of a multidimensional or enforcement peacekeeping operation* and *not associated with the presence of any other type of peacekeeping operation.*

However, my theoretical framework suggests that enforcement is less important than the structure of interethnic relations—the balance of demographic power and divisions between ethnic groups. Nonetheless, international peacekeepers can still play a critical part by lowering transaction costs of crafting an institutional power-sharing agreement (Beardsley 2008). They can help belligerents identify the size of different ethnic groups and serve as critical

mediators between ethnic groups that want to institutionalize power-sharing (Svensson 2009; Cunningham 2012).

Hypothesis 5 *The probability of institutional power-sharing is positively associated with the presence of any UN peacekeeping mission.*

Method

In order to test my hypotheses, I constructed an original dataset of 186 instances of power-sharing negotiations from 1945-2011. I read through each of the agreements from the 186 negotiations and coded each for power-sharing type and ethnic group factionalization. The major difference between my dataset and existing data on power-sharing is that I include *any* negotiation that may result in power-sharing. A negotiation entered my data if leaders of at least two major parties discussed post-conflict governance as part of a negotiated agreement. To find eligible peace agreements, I used the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement Dataset Version 2.0 (Pettersson et al. 2019), the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute's Peace Agreement Matrix, the United States Institute of Peace's Peace Agreements Digital Collection, and the United Nations Peacemaker Peace Agreement database.

I operationalized the dependent variable, `pshare_inst`, as a binary indicator for whether power-sharing negotiations resulted in institutional power-sharing (1) or not (0). For each power-sharing negotiation, I read over the peace agreement and indicated in my data what type of power-sharing is chosen according to the following criteria, based upon the conceptualization of power-sharing described above.

Leaders agree to institutional power-sharing if the peace agreement contains guarantees for shared control of an executive institution or a legislative institution from which an executive (e.g., a prime minister) is chosen, thereby ensuring a mutual veto in the executive selection process. Consider the explicit language about the executive branch in the Accra

Accords that ended the Second Liberian Civil war. The accords established the National National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to replace the existing government of Liberia. The selection of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the NTGL would be done by consensus, according to the accords. As a result, the ex-government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—the major belligerents—all possessed a veto.

I code an agreement as a case of proportional power-sharing if the peace agreement provides electoral quotas in the legislature or in cabinet positions but does not guarantee any further sharing or offer a veto in the executive selection process. The focus of the peace agreement is typically on legitimizing a former rebel group in order to make it competitive for future elections. This includes provisions that recognizes rebel groups as political parties and allows them to held political office. For instance, consider the 1999 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), also known as the Lome Accord. Article III, entitled 'Transformation of the RUF/SL Into a Political Party,' is devoted entirely to legalizing the RUF/SL. Article V guaranteesd the RUF/SL four cabinet positions in an expanded cabinet of eighteen ministers. Importantly, the agreement did not give the RUF/SL shared control of the Presidency or the ability to veto the selection of the President, making this a case of proportional rather than institutional power-sharing.

[**Table II about here**]

I identify 186 total cases of power-sharing negotiations: 51 resulting in institutional power-sharing, 9 in proportional power-sharing, and 126 no form of power-sharing. Table II charts these cases according to whether a dominant majority group was present, whether the majority of groups was unified, and by type of power-sharing agreed to.

I operationalize the structure of ethnic power relations using Version 2018.1.1 of the

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Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009). For each power-sharing negotiation, I identified the five largest politically salient ethnic groups and their share of the population. I list these groups for each case in the Online Appendix. I construct a variable entitled `group1` that indicates the size of the largest ethnic group. In most cases, `group1` takes on a constant value for all cases within a given country. For example, EPR identifies the Sara ethnic group as the largest in Chad, numbering 0.24 of the population. This holds for all 14 cases of negotiations in Chad, ranging from 1978-2006. In addition, I construct a binary indicator for whether the country is dominated by a majority group entitled `majgrp`. The variable takes a value of 1 if the size of the largest group exceeds 0.50 and 0 if it does not.

Next, I operationalize ethnic fractionalization by looking at the number of negotiating parties that represent each ethnic group or, per the conceptualization, might potentially represent each ethnic group. To find each faction, I list all factions considered active in the conflict according to the UCDP-factions dataset, including the government. For each party, I consulted the secondary literature to see which ethnic group or groups it represented or primarily recruited from. I consider ethnic groups represented by solely one faction unified. I consider any ethnic groups represented by more than one faction not unified. The binary variable `majunified` takes a value of 1 if the majority of ethnic groups, as measured by population, was unified and 0 if a minority of ethnic groups was unified. Because intraethnic divisions are not salient for power-sharing negotiations involving a majority group, I only coded factions for cases where the largest ethnic group was in the plurality, not majority. I describe this process along with the coding for each case in greater detail in the Online Appendix.

Power-sharing negotiations featured mostly unified ethnic groups. Of 83 power-sharing negotiations not involving a majority, in 48 were the majority of ethnic groups unified. In some of these case, all politically relevant ethnic groups were unified. In Angola, for instance,

the Ovimbundu-Ovambo group was represented solely by UNITA, which recruited primarily from the Ovimbundu. The other three politically salient ethnic groups—the Mbundu-Mestico, the Bakongo, and Lunda-Chokwe—were all represented solely by the MPLA. In other cases, however, not all ethnic groups were unified but a majority were. For example, although Bosnian Serbs were divided at the peace negotiations at the Dayton accords, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were each unified, representing a majority of the population. In 35 of the power-sharing negotiations, a majority of the ethnic groups, by population, were not unified. For example, though the Bateke ethnic group were only represented by the Cocoyes during the negotiations that ended the civil war in the Republic of Congo in 1999, they are only 0.13 of the population. The Lari/Bakongo ethnic group, the largest ethnic group at 0.30 of the population, was represented by both the Ninjas and the Ntsiloulous. Moreover, the Mbochi, 0.09 of the population, were divided between the government and Cobra fighters.

Third, I operationalize international peacekeeping using three variables that capture the UN presence during each negotiation: (1) `unintrvn`, a binary indicator for the presence of a peacekeeping operation, (2) `unstrong`, a binary variable indicating whether the peacekeeping operation was a multidimensional peace enforcement mission with Chapter VII authorization or not, (3) `unweak`, a binary indicator for whether the peacekeeping operation did not have Chapter VII approval. I draw upon Doyle and Sambanis's data to code these variables. I extend their data from 2003 to 2011 using publicly available data from the UN in order to cover all the cases in my dataset.

Results

To test the hypotheses I employ logistic regressions models using agreement to institutional power-sharing as the dependent variable. In each model, I adjust for ethno-linguistic frac-

tionalization (`ELF`). This variable measures general levels of societal fractionalization and we would expect that that the more fractionalized a society is, the harder it is to agree to a formal institutional power-sharing arrangement. Moreover, ethnic fractionalization might be associated with the likelihood of concluding an agreement in the first place, suggesting that it is an important variable for which to adjust (Roeder 2005). I also adjust for GDP growth as state capacity and economic growth might be associated with group factionalization and existing institutions within the state polity that may make further institutionalization easier. Next, I adjust for whether the conflict was, at the time of the negotiations, at a stalemate or not (Zartman 1993). Finally, I also include consecutive current years of democracy at the time of negotiations to proxy for past democratic achievement, which may also be associated with institutionalized power-sharing success. For all models, I use robust, country-year clustered standard errors. Table III reports the results of these estimations.

[**Table III about here**]

[**Figure 1 about here**]

In Model 1, the main independent variable is the presence of a majority. In line with Hypothesis 1, the results from Model 1 support the theoretical expectation that in power-sharing negotiations, the presence of a majority group is negatively associated to a substantively and statistically significant extent with the likelihood of an institutional power-sharing agreement emerging. For ease of interpretation, I graph predicted probabilities derived from Model 1 in Figure 1. In the absence of a UN mission with all continuous control variables held at their mean and binary control variables at their median, the predicted probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement drops from 0.25 to 0.04 in the presence of a majority group. In the presence of a UN mission, the probability drops from 0.62 to 0.19. Regardless of whether the UN is present or not, the presence of a majority is associated with a decrease in predicted probability of the parties agreeing to an institutional power-sharing.

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Out of 103 cases of power-sharing negotiations with a majority group, institutional power-sharing emerged on only 15 occasions (14.6%). However, these cases should not necessarily lead us to reject Hypothesis 1. For example, consider five occasions upon which institutional power-sharing was agreed upon between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi (2000, 2002, 2003) and Rwanda (1992, 1993).

In Burundi, the majority Hutu ethnic group was divided. A conservative estimate, the Hutus were divided into at least two major blocs/factions during power-sharing negotiations that began in the late 1990s: the FDD (and the CNDD as its political wing) and the FNL (and its political wing, PALIPEHUTU). Although my theory predicts that proportional or no power-sharing is likelier to emerge out of power-sharing negotiations in this case, it also suggests that institutional power-sharing might be a possibility since a divided majority ethnic group (in this case, the Hutu factions) would fear that a minority ethnic group (the Tutsis) would garner more votes than any of the majority group factions in a post-conflict election.

The circumstances surrounding the power-sharing agreement between Hutus and Tutsis in 1992 and 1993 similarly suggest that major divisions between the majority ethnic group led to institutional power-sharing. Although there were only two major belligerents in the Rwandan civil war—the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—internal divisions within Hutus played an important role in the negotiations and, indeed, the future of politics in the state. Such divisions ostensibly convinced negotiators that electoral power-sharing would allow unified Tutsis to dominate the political landscape. Indeed, since the RPF took over the capital of Kigali following the 1994 genocide, Tutsis have dominated electoral politics in Rwanda (Lemarchand 2006).

For these reasons, none of these five cases should lead us to reject Hypothesis 1.

[**Figure 2 about here**]

Hypothesis 2 states that the probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement is negatively associated with the size of the largest ethnic group. In Model 2, I regress the dependent variable on the size of the largest group with standard controls to test this hypothesis. The coefficient for the size of the largest group size is negative and statistically of significant. For ease of interpretation, Figure 2 graphs predicted probabilities derived from Model 2, holding all continuous control variables at their mean and binary control variables at their median while varying group size with a UN mission (blue shaded area) and without a UN mission (red shaded area). Even in the presence of a UN mission, the probability of institutional power-sharing steadily decreases as the size of the largest group increases. These results support Hypothesis 2.

The dynamics underlying institutionalized power-sharing in Liberia lend further support to this hypothesis. One ethnic group had dominated Liberian politics for most of its pre-conflict history (either Americo-Liberians or the Krahn) until 1989. Institutionalized power-sharing between several small ethnic groups was a part of at least four peace negotiations and agreements, with varying degrees of success: the 1993 Cotonou Accord, the 1994 Akosombo Agreement, the 1995 Abuja Agreement, and the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Although international actors were present in the negotiations for some of these agreements, the structure of ethnic groups remained broadly the same: none of the ethnic groups that are a part of power-sharing in Liberia constituted more than 10% of the population. For this reason, electoral power-sharing in Liberia would potentially allow some ethnic groups to seize power while excluding others, an outcome that non-Krahn ethnic groups and some Krahn had fought two civil wars to prevent. Institutional power-sharing allowed leaders from former warring parties—specifically Charles Taylor's government and rebel groups drawing from minority ethnic groups such as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—to ensure that they had at

least some share of post-conflict political power (Levitt 2006; Mehler 2009).[3]

According to Hypothesis 3, institutional power-sharing should be likelier to emerge in multi-party negotiations in which at least a majority of ethnic groups unified. To test this hypothesis, I regress the dependent variable on a binary indicatory for whether the majority of ethnic groups are unified or not. Model 3 presents results affirming this hypothesis—the likelihood of institutional power-sharing is positively associated to a substantively and statistically significant extent with the indicator for whether the majority of ethnic groups is unified or not. Figure 3 summarizes the predicted probabilities from the model for ease of interpretation. In the absence of a UN mission with continuous control variables held at their mean and binary control variables held at their median, the presence of a majority of ethnic groups that are unified is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement from 0.06 to 0.37. In the presence of a UN mission, the presence of a majority of ethnic groups that are unified is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement from 0.23 to 0.72. Regardless of the status of the UN, unified groups are associated with an increase in the probability of the groups agreeing to institutional power-sharing, a result in line with Hypothesis 3.

The power-sharing negotiations following the Bosnian civil war in Dayton, Ohio lend credence to the theoretical logic underlying both Hypothesis 2 and 3. The Bosniaks, who after the war comprised almost 44% of the population, a near majority, did not want to institutionalize power-sharing (Chollet 1997, p. 72). However, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, who jointly accounted for a majority of the Bosnian population, demanded institutional power-sharing guarantees with a joint presidency between the three ethnic groups. The Bosniaks insisted that the chairman of the joint presidency be whomever had received the largest

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[3]Some of these ethnic groups, including the Krahn, were divided into several different factions and rebel groups, a dynamic that I discuss in greater detail below.

percentage of the state-wide popular vote. The Croats and Serbs, knowing that the largest vote-getter by percentage would almost certainly be a Bosniak, pushed for a rotation of the chairmanship, fearing that the *de facto* result of the Bosniak proposal would not amount to an institutional power-sharing arrangement. The Bosniaks ultimately relented, conceding the rotation of the chairmanship as a way to guarantee Croat and Serb participation in state governance (Chollet 1997, p. 237). In exchange, the Croats and Serbs conceded that the first chairman, likely Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegovic, would be determined via popular vote. While internal divisions within the Croat and Serb delegations emerged and, at times, jeopardized the negotiations, each ethnic group was able to remain unified and, as a result, push for institutional power-sharing as a majority (Holbrooke 1998).

Hypotheses 4 and 5 concern the potential effect of UN peacekeeping operations on the likelihood of institutional power-sharing. Hypothesis 4 stated that the probability of institutional power-sharing is positively associated with multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations but not any other type of UN. Hypothesis 5 stated that any UN peacekeeping operation, regardless of mandate, is associated with a higher likelihood of institutional power-sharing. To test these hypotheses, I include a binary indicator for whether the UN was a part of the peace negotiations in Models 1-3. In addition, in Model 4, I regress the dependent variable on the UN PKO indicator as the main variable. The result is robust to all four model specifications—the coefficient is substantively and statistically positively associated with the likelihood of institutional power-sharing. Moreover, as Figures 1-3 show, UN peacekeeping is associated with a clear increase in the predicted probability of institutional power-sharing. For example, in the absence of a majority group, the presence of the UN is associated with an increase in the probability of institutional power-sharing from 0.29 to 0.71 (see Figure 1).

In order to test these hypotheses directly, I replace the binary UN intervention indicator in Models 1-4 with two other variables in Model 5—Strong PKO, indicating the presence

of an enforcement or multidimensional peacekeeping operations, and Weak PKO, indicating the presence of a mediation, observational, or traditional peacekeeping mission. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the results from the model suggests that *both* types of peacekeeping operations are effective—both indicators are positive as well as substantively and statistically significant. These results lend credence to Hypothesis 5.

The Dayton Peace Accord negotiations further support Hypothesis 5 over Hypothesis 4. The evidence from this case does not suggest that the choice of institutional power-sharing over other types of power-sharing was related to the robust international presence. Indeed, it was not clear during the negotiations how large or long the United Nations peacekeeping operation would be (Holbrooke 1998). Rather, it appears that international actors, drawing upon experience from other post-conflict negotiations, were able to provide the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats with the legal and institutional framework to make the aforementioned compromises; in effect lowering the transaction costs to making an institutional power-sharing agreement. For instance, the evidence suggests that international negotiators suggested two critical facets of institutional rather than electoral power-sharing: that the chairmanship of the presidency rotate between the three ethnic groups and that each ethnic group retain formal veto rights (Kostic 2009, p. 32-33).

Discussion

The data analysis provides strong support for the main hypotheses outlined in this paper. In particular, the quantitative analyses suggest that institutional power-sharing is *negatively* associated with the presence of a majority group (Hypothesis 1) and the size of the largest group in a post-conflict society (Hypothesis 2) but *positively* associated with the presence of a unified majority of ethnic groups (Hypothesis 3) and a UN peacekeeping operation, regardless of mandate (Hypothesis 5). All associations were substantively and statistically

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significant.

However, two key empirical concerns remain. First, as with any original coding schema, it might be the case that the findings depend on the coding of certain cases or the inclusion of certain variables in a model specification. Second, since none of the key explanatory variables—presence of a majority, group size, group fractionalization, and presence of peace-keeping operation—is exogenous, it might be the case that an omitted, unobservable variable is introducing bias into these coefficient estimates, suggesting a spurious correlation. I address these concerns head on in this section. I demonstrate that the results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including different coding schemes and model specifications. In addition, I conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis which shows that the existence of an unobservable confounder is highly unlikely.

Robustness Checks

I conducted several sets of robustness checks for the main results, all of which I include in the Online Appendix. I vary the window defining what is considered a "majority group" in order to address any potential concerns with measurement error. The results of Model 1 are robust to re-operationalizing a majority group as being as small as 35% of the population. After this cutoff, the size of the majority group ceases to have a statistically significant association with the likelihood of institutional power-sharing. This suggests that large groups are likely to get to their way at the negotiating table even when not precisely a majority. This could be due to a perceived dominance of the largest group, even in the absence of demographic dominance, or actual measurement error. In either case, the results from the main analysis hold.

Next, I re-code the dependent variable to address potential concerns about the coding of institutional as opposed to proportional power-sharing. First, I re-code the dependent variable so it is a binary indicator for *either* proportional or institutional power-sharing.

Second, I omit proportional power-sharing entirely from the analysis so the dependent variable indicates whether the negotiating parties agreed to institutional power-sharing or no power-sharing at all. All models are robust to all of these potential coding changes. This suggests that the main results in this paper are not dependent on any particular coding schema.

Finally, I control for additional characteristics of the post-conflict society and the conflict itself. Specifically, I include controls for the population of the state, whether the post-conflict state was a British colony, an indicator for fuel dependence, and whether the conflict was a separatist conflict or not. The results remain robust to including these covariates. Interestingly, the indicator for whether the conflict was a separatist conflict or not is negatively associated with the likelihood of institutional power-sharing across model specifications, though it is not always statistically significant. This suggest that it is possible to satisfy belligerents fighting for territorial autonomy with other forms of power-sharing, without conceding power at the center.

Sensitivity Analysis

As with any observational study, the potential presence of omitted variable bias prevents us from making causal inferences from the main results in the paper. To address this concern head on, I use a sensitivity analysis method developed by Frank (2000) to estimate the magnitude necessary for an omitted variable to invalidate a inference about a given explanatory variable.[4] For each model, I estimate the "impact" necessary for an omitted variable to make the main explanatory variable lose statistical significance. Impact is defined as the product between the correlation of the main explanatory variable and the omitted variable and the correlation of the dependent variable and the omitted variable.

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[4]I used the `konfound` package for `R` developed by Joshua Rosenberg, Ran Xu, and Ken Frank to conduct the analysis.

Table IV summarizes the sensitivity analysis. For Model 1, which estimates the relationship between the presence of a majority group and the likelihood of institutional power-sharing, the impact of an omitted variable needs to be 0.174 to eliminate the statistically significance of the coefficient estimate for majority group. For comparison, this is larger than the impact of any of the three primary controls used in the analysis. It is extremely unlikely that either such an omitted variable exists or that I have not adjusted for this in either the main analysis or the comprehensive robustness checks. Similarly, for Models 3 and 4, in which the main explanatory variable is the presence of a unified majority of ethnic groups and a UN peacekeeping operation respectively, the impact level needed for the omitted variable to invalidate a causal inference is high enough to suggest that it is extremely unlikely that such a variable exists and has not been included in the analysis.

The impact level threshold for an omitted variable in Model 2, which tests the relationship between the likelihood of institutional power-sharing and the size of the largest group, is relatively lower. However, even in this case, with the exception of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the impact level threshold is the largest of the major control variables, all of which are well-established in the literature as important causes of power-sharing agreements, factionalization, or both. This suggests that an omitted variable needs to be *more* important than GDP growth, the presence of a military stalemate, and the age of democratic institutions in order to invalidate a causal inference made about the size of the largest group. As such, it remains unlikely that an omitted variable exists for which I did not account given the number of variables adjusted for in the analyses.

Conclusion

Despite the prominence of power-sharing in negotiated settlements to ethnic civil wars, relatively little is known about the process by which former belligerents to agree to share post-conflict power. Indeed, existing research has overwhelmingly focused on how power-sharing affects the likelihood that conflict will recur within a state (Binningsbø 2013; Ottmann and Vullers 2015). This article improves the scholarly understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing through the development of a novel theoretical framework that emphasizes ethnic divisions and the balance of demographic power between ethnic groups to understand the circumstances under which former belligerents choose to institutionalize power-sharing. I test the implications of the theory using an original dataset of 186 cases of power-sharing negotiations from 1945-2011.

I find that the presence of a majority group is associated with a decrease in probability of institutional power-sharing. Additionally, I find that the probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement increases when a majority of ethnic groups are unified and in the presence of international peacekeepers. I show that these results are robust to various model specifications and operationalizations of the main variables. I also demonstrate that the results are very likely not sensitive to the presence of hypothetical omitted variables. Although the descriptive and associational nature of the quantitative findings provided in this paper limits the causal interpretation of the results, the theoretical mechanisms and evidence outlined in the paper provide a useful guide for thinking about potential confounding variables in analyses related to power-sharing institutions.

The paper offers important insights for policy-makers, potential conflict mediators, and officials in the United Nations that hope to promote institutional power-sharing. Conventional wisdom holds that international peacekeeeping operations need to maintain a robust posture and deploy substantial forces with a broad mandate to enforce defections in order

to support the creation of power-sharing institutions. However, I show that any type of peacekeeping operation—as long as it can provide belligerents with information and lower transaction costs—increases the probability of an institutional power-sharing agreement. Although robust mandates and multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations may still be essential to maintaining peace after conflict, these findings suggest that they are not critical for advancing an institutional power-sharing solution. Moreover, the empirical results highlight a set of "most likely" and "least likely" cases for international actors. Given that the size and existing factionalization of ethnic groups are structural features of a post-conflict society that are difficult to change, international actors should avoid cases in which power-sharing is unlikely to emerge. Specifically, the main results of the paper suggests that international actors should focus on post-conflict states in which there is not a majority or in which the majority of ethnic groups are unified. It is in these two sets of cases in which institutional power-sharing is likeliest to emerge when international actors apply pressure.

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Tables

Table I. Expected power-sharing outcomess

Scenario	Outcome
Majority group present, any ethnic division	Proportional or no power-sharing
Majority group absent, most groups unified	Institutional power-sharing
Majority group absent, most groups divided	Proportional or no power-sharing

Table II. Counts of power-sharing by type and majority presence.

	Institutional	Proportional	None	Total
Majority Present	15	1	87	103
No Majority Present	36	8	39	83
Total	51	9	126	186
Majority unified	30	0	18	48
Majority not unified	6	8	21	35
Total	36	8	39	83

Note: ethnic factionalization was only coded for 83 cases in which majority was not present

Table III. Logit regression results. Robust, country-year-clustered standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Majority Present	−1.960***				
	(0.605)				
Largest Group Size		−3.051*			
		(1.640)			
Majority Unified			2.153***		
			(0.535)		
UNPKO	1.575***	1.562***	1.462***	1.399***	
	(0.501)	(0.520)	(0.522)	(0.489)	
Strong PKO					1.797***
					(0.573)
Weak PKO					0.963*
					(0.551)
ELF	−1.687	−1.703	−0.786	0.957	0.865
	(1.337)	(1.755)	(1.290)	(1.128)	(1.150)
GDP Growth	0.021	0.021	0.030	0.020	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Stalemate	0.200	0.035	−0.102	0.028	0.035
	(0.455)	(0.435)	(0.500)	(0.435)	(0.430)
Democracy Age	−0.066	−0.089	−0.085	−0.103	−0.128
	(0.081)	(0.101)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.150)
Observations	186	186	186	186	186

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table IV. Sensitivity analysis: Impact level necessary for confounder to invalidate inference compared to impact level of key controls.

	Omitted Variable	ELF	GDP Growth	Stalemate	Dem. Age
Majority group present (Model 1)	**0.174**	0.097	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.055
Size of largest group (Model 2)	0.038	**0.117**	0.002	< 0.001	0.030
Majority of groups unified (Model 3)	**0.311**	0.055	< 0.001	0.005	0.047
UN PKO present (Model 4)	**0.193**	0.011	0.003	0.019	0.060

Note: largest impact level for each model bolded.

Figures

Figure 1. Predicted probability of institutional power-sharing by presence of and whether UN was present or not.

Note: Predicted probabilities derived from logit model 1, holding control variables at their mean. Lines indicate 95% confidence interval.

Figure 2. Predicted probability of institutional power-sharing as a function of the size of the largest group, by UN presence.

Note: Predicted probabilities derived from logit model 2, holding control variables at their mean. Shaded area indicates 90% confidence interval.

Figure 3. Predicted probability of institutional power-sharing by whether the majority of ethnic groups were unified or not and whether UN was present or not.

Note: Predicted probabilities derived from logit model 3, holding control variables at their mean. Lines indicate 95% confidence interval.