Publications
"What is the Mechanism Underlying Audience Costs? Incompetence, Belligerence, and Inconsistency." With Nicholas Sambanis. Conditionally accepted at Journal of Peace Research.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
"Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?" Journal of Politics. Vol 77, No. 3 (July 2015). With Nikolay Marinov and Josh Robbins. (Gated)
PDF | PDF with supplementary analyses | Replication Files | Cite
This research was also featured on the Empirical Studies of Conflict.
"Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change.” International Security. Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/2014).
PDF | Replication Files | Cite
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
"Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?" Journal of Politics. Vol 77, No. 3 (July 2015). With Nikolay Marinov and Josh Robbins. (Gated)
PDF | PDF with supplementary analyses | Replication Files | Cite
This research was also featured on the Empirical Studies of Conflict.
"Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change.” International Security. Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/2014).
PDF | Replication Files | Cite
Manuscripts Under Review
How Do International Actors Contain Local-Level Violence? Evidence from Peacebuilding in Mali.
How do United Nations peacekeepers stop disputes over land and other issues driven by local agendas? Existing cross-national research has shown that UN peacekeepers increase the likelihood that armed groups will agree to peace negotiations. Regardless, recent critiques suggest that locally-derived motivations---at the level of the individual, family, clan, and ethnic group---fuel violence even after groups have signed peace agreements. Yet scholars have not explained whether these local-level conflicts undermine promising settlements and the prospects of peace writ large. In this paper, I argue that UN peacekeepers prevent locally-motivated disputes from escalating by promoting non-violent forms of conflict-resolution. I draw upon evidence from fieldwork conducted in Mali, the site of an ongoing ethnic conflict with UN and French peacekeeping operations. I leverage a lab-in-the-field experiment to show that UN peacebuilders increase intergroup cooperation relative to local authorities as well as French peacekeepers. In order to demonstrate how cooperation aggregates, I also use a survey experiment to show that UN peacekeepers decrease the likelihood that local land disputes will become violent. I find that perceptions of the UN as unbiased enforcers of individual interactions account for its ability to mitigate the danger of local-level disputes. The findings presented in this paper suggest a new pathway by which the UN builds peace in conflict settings.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
This paper is part of a broader book project. A description of the project and a chapter outline can be found here.
Why Share? An Analysis of the Sources of Power-Sharing after Conflict. Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Peace Research.
Why do former belligerents institutionalize power-sharing arrangements after a civil war ends? What explains parties’ desire to seek constitutional guarantees during peace negotiations rather than rely on electoral results alone to form governing coalitions? I suggest that elites create power-sharing institutions when the most significant threat to their political power comes from an outside group as opposed to from within their own group. That is, forward-looking and power-minded leaders of former belligerents push for the type of power-sharing at the negotiating table that affords them the greatest opportunity to influence national politics after the conflict has concluded in full. For elites facing competition from outside, this means securing power-sharing through institutional rules and guidelines in the settlement of the civil war to ensure that they are included in the governance of the state. By contrast, for elites fearing in-group rivals, complex governance institutions are at best unnecessary and, at worst, an unnecessary concession to weaker opponents. I test my theory using a cross-national analysis of a dataset of all negotiated settlements since the end of the Second World War, coded for power-sharing variation. I complement the quantitative data with illustrative examples from cases of power-sharing negotiations that offer insight into the proposed theoretical mechanisms.
PDF
How UN Peacebuilding Unintentionally Incentivizes Local-Level Violence. Under review.
This paper challenges theoretical and empirical arguments about peacebuilding effectiveness that put the state at the center of United Nations peace operations. The paper draws on evidence from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from 2013 to 2017. I argue that state-centric UN peacebuilding operations inadvertently incentivize local-level violence in post-conflict zones. I demonstrate that when the UN supports central governments it unintentionally empowers non-professionalized militaries, paramilitaries, and warlords to settle local scores. Armed violence against civilians in turn triggers a vicious cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals. As an alternative to state-centric peacebuilding operations that incentivize local violence, I suggest that the UN should shift strategic resources away from central governments and toward UN policing, support of traditional and religious authorities, and the training of local security institutions.
PDF
How do United Nations peacekeepers stop disputes over land and other issues driven by local agendas? Existing cross-national research has shown that UN peacekeepers increase the likelihood that armed groups will agree to peace negotiations. Regardless, recent critiques suggest that locally-derived motivations---at the level of the individual, family, clan, and ethnic group---fuel violence even after groups have signed peace agreements. Yet scholars have not explained whether these local-level conflicts undermine promising settlements and the prospects of peace writ large. In this paper, I argue that UN peacekeepers prevent locally-motivated disputes from escalating by promoting non-violent forms of conflict-resolution. I draw upon evidence from fieldwork conducted in Mali, the site of an ongoing ethnic conflict with UN and French peacekeeping operations. I leverage a lab-in-the-field experiment to show that UN peacebuilders increase intergroup cooperation relative to local authorities as well as French peacekeepers. In order to demonstrate how cooperation aggregates, I also use a survey experiment to show that UN peacekeepers decrease the likelihood that local land disputes will become violent. I find that perceptions of the UN as unbiased enforcers of individual interactions account for its ability to mitigate the danger of local-level disputes. The findings presented in this paper suggest a new pathway by which the UN builds peace in conflict settings.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
This paper is part of a broader book project. A description of the project and a chapter outline can be found here.
Why Share? An Analysis of the Sources of Power-Sharing after Conflict. Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Peace Research.
Why do former belligerents institutionalize power-sharing arrangements after a civil war ends? What explains parties’ desire to seek constitutional guarantees during peace negotiations rather than rely on electoral results alone to form governing coalitions? I suggest that elites create power-sharing institutions when the most significant threat to their political power comes from an outside group as opposed to from within their own group. That is, forward-looking and power-minded leaders of former belligerents push for the type of power-sharing at the negotiating table that affords them the greatest opportunity to influence national politics after the conflict has concluded in full. For elites facing competition from outside, this means securing power-sharing through institutional rules and guidelines in the settlement of the civil war to ensure that they are included in the governance of the state. By contrast, for elites fearing in-group rivals, complex governance institutions are at best unnecessary and, at worst, an unnecessary concession to weaker opponents. I test my theory using a cross-national analysis of a dataset of all negotiated settlements since the end of the Second World War, coded for power-sharing variation. I complement the quantitative data with illustrative examples from cases of power-sharing negotiations that offer insight into the proposed theoretical mechanisms.
How UN Peacebuilding Unintentionally Incentivizes Local-Level Violence. Under review.
This paper challenges theoretical and empirical arguments about peacebuilding effectiveness that put the state at the center of United Nations peace operations. The paper draws on evidence from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from 2013 to 2017. I argue that state-centric UN peacebuilding operations inadvertently incentivize local-level violence in post-conflict zones. I demonstrate that when the UN supports central governments it unintentionally empowers non-professionalized militaries, paramilitaries, and warlords to settle local scores. Armed violence against civilians in turn triggers a vicious cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals. As an alternative to state-centric peacebuilding operations that incentivize local violence, I suggest that the UN should shift strategic resources away from central governments and toward UN policing, support of traditional and religious authorities, and the training of local security institutions.
Manuscripts Available upon Request
Legitimacy after Conflict? Security Perceptions and State Legitimacy in Liberia. With Eric Stollenwerk.
What explains the legitimacy of state institutions after conflict? Establishing the legitimacy of its authority is a critical task for a post-conflict state. Lacking capacity, these states must rely on the legitimacy of their institutions in order to govern effectively. Yet, the onset of local violence and citizens’ perceptions of insecurity may undermine this legitimacy. Theories of output-based legitimacy hold that effective service provision increases the legitimacy of a state. This paper analyzes the extent to which perceptions of security among the local population foster state legitimacy in Liberia. We leverage data from an original SMS survey that yielded a nationally representative sample of 2,000 Liberians from all 15 counties. Using this survey data we are able to compare the legitimacy of the state on the district and on the county level. We find that security perceptions of the population play a key role in strengthening state legitimacy in Liberia both on the district as well as on the county level. We also find that citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice and democratic input foster legitimacy. The results underline the importance of security provision for establishing state legitimacy after conflict. They also demonstrate that sources of state legitimacy are multifaceted.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
Peaceful Coexistence? Soviet-Led Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution brought his Communist Party to power in 1917, Vladimr Ilyich Lenin warned party members that “a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.” Lenin undertook a foreign policy, which future Soviet premiers would continue, designed to accelerate the Proleteriat revolution abroad. As part of this policy, the Red Army would invade foreign states and replace existing governments with Communist Party leaders that would entirely re-align the domestic and foreign policy of those states, principally in favor of the Soviet Union. In this regard, 1917 marks a watershed in military intervention politics, demarcating a time period after which states—the Soviet Union as well as its adversaries in the West—used foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC), defined as foreign military intervention with the explicit purpose of removing an existing regime and replacing it with another, as a critical tool of policy-making. I argue that due to the far-reaching ideological implications of the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union’s FIRC operations were qualitatively different than those carried out by other states, primarily the United States and its allies. In particular, compared to other interventions, Soviet FIRCs were less likely to lead to democracy, more likely to increase bilateral trade with the intervener (the Soviet Union), more likely to increase ideological alignment with the intervener, less likely to lead to intrastate conflict, and less likely to lead to interstate conflict, both with the Soviet Union as well as with neighboring states. In order to test my argument, I adopt a three-pronged approach, First, I present a quantitative analysis of the impact of Soviet FIRCs compared to other FIRCs. I control for relevant demographic and temporal variables. Second, I present historical case study evidence from the Soviet imposition of Communist rule in Bulgaria beginning in 1944. Third, I present evidence from the Soviet FIRC in Afghanistan in 1979. I show that the Soviet failures to produce a stable Communist regime in Afghanistan can best be understood as a transformation in the motives of Soviet leaders, who were, by 1979, less focused on continuing the revolution of 1917 and more on directly confronting the United States.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
What explains the legitimacy of state institutions after conflict? Establishing the legitimacy of its authority is a critical task for a post-conflict state. Lacking capacity, these states must rely on the legitimacy of their institutions in order to govern effectively. Yet, the onset of local violence and citizens’ perceptions of insecurity may undermine this legitimacy. Theories of output-based legitimacy hold that effective service provision increases the legitimacy of a state. This paper analyzes the extent to which perceptions of security among the local population foster state legitimacy in Liberia. We leverage data from an original SMS survey that yielded a nationally representative sample of 2,000 Liberians from all 15 counties. Using this survey data we are able to compare the legitimacy of the state on the district and on the county level. We find that security perceptions of the population play a key role in strengthening state legitimacy in Liberia both on the district as well as on the county level. We also find that citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice and democratic input foster legitimacy. The results underline the importance of security provision for establishing state legitimacy after conflict. They also demonstrate that sources of state legitimacy are multifaceted.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
Peaceful Coexistence? Soviet-Led Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution brought his Communist Party to power in 1917, Vladimr Ilyich Lenin warned party members that “a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.” Lenin undertook a foreign policy, which future Soviet premiers would continue, designed to accelerate the Proleteriat revolution abroad. As part of this policy, the Red Army would invade foreign states and replace existing governments with Communist Party leaders that would entirely re-align the domestic and foreign policy of those states, principally in favor of the Soviet Union. In this regard, 1917 marks a watershed in military intervention politics, demarcating a time period after which states—the Soviet Union as well as its adversaries in the West—used foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC), defined as foreign military intervention with the explicit purpose of removing an existing regime and replacing it with another, as a critical tool of policy-making. I argue that due to the far-reaching ideological implications of the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union’s FIRC operations were qualitatively different than those carried out by other states, primarily the United States and its allies. In particular, compared to other interventions, Soviet FIRCs were less likely to lead to democracy, more likely to increase bilateral trade with the intervener (the Soviet Union), more likely to increase ideological alignment with the intervener, less likely to lead to intrastate conflict, and less likely to lead to interstate conflict, both with the Soviet Union as well as with neighboring states. In order to test my argument, I adopt a three-pronged approach, First, I present a quantitative analysis of the impact of Soviet FIRCs compared to other FIRCs. I control for relevant demographic and temporal variables. Second, I present historical case study evidence from the Soviet imposition of Communist rule in Bulgaria beginning in 1944. Third, I present evidence from the Soviet FIRC in Afghanistan in 1979. I show that the Soviet failures to produce a stable Communist regime in Afghanistan can best be understood as a transformation in the motives of Soviet leaders, who were, by 1979, less focused on continuing the revolution of 1917 and more on directly confronting the United States.
Please contact me for a copy of the latest draft.
Work-in-Progress
Patrolling for Peace: An Analysis of the Level-Level Effects of UN Peacekeeping. With Patrick Hunnicutt and Neil Narang.
Countering Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso. With Allison Grossman and Niloufer Siddiqui.
Countering Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso. With Allison Grossman and Niloufer Siddiqui.
Commentary
Democracies' Electoral Compromise. The National Interest. July 29, 2015. With Nikolay Marinov.
The tactic of increasing American involvement abroad without deploying troops mirrors many of President Obama and Secretary Carter’s other national security policies in 2015—sanctions against Russia and Iran, a carrier to interdict Iranian weapons moving to Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the placement of U.S. military equipment across Eastern Europe. Many different factors play into each U.S. foreign policy decision, but our research shows that the similarity in these decisions may simply be that 2015 is the beginning of a U.S. election cycle. In our analysis of fifty contributing countries to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, we find that these types of policies, which limit and/or reduce troops on the ground in order to minimize casualties, are typical of democratic countries entering electoral periods. Put otherwise, leaders choose policies that reduce the risk of casualties based on electoral considerations rather than the specific strategic needs of an international crisis, potentially undermining its successful resolution.
The tactic of increasing American involvement abroad without deploying troops mirrors many of President Obama and Secretary Carter’s other national security policies in 2015—sanctions against Russia and Iran, a carrier to interdict Iranian weapons moving to Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the placement of U.S. military equipment across Eastern Europe. Many different factors play into each U.S. foreign policy decision, but our research shows that the similarity in these decisions may simply be that 2015 is the beginning of a U.S. election cycle. In our analysis of fifty contributing countries to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, we find that these types of policies, which limit and/or reduce troops on the ground in order to minimize casualties, are typical of democratic countries entering electoral periods. Put otherwise, leaders choose policies that reduce the risk of casualties based on electoral considerations rather than the specific strategic needs of an international crisis, potentially undermining its successful resolution.
