Scholarly Publications
2. "Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?" Journal of Politics. Vol 77, No. 3 (July 2015). With Nikolay Marinov and Josh Robbins. (Gated)
How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy-makers near elections is that of time-inconsistency. The time inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF”) and the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is the first arguably identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy
PDF | PDF with supplementary analyses | Replication Files | Cite
This research was also featured on the Empirical Studies of Conflict.
1. "Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change.” International Security. Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/2014).
Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten’s article “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign- Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization” offers important contributions to the study of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC). The authors should be commended for their use of advanced empirical methods to tackle such an important substantive question. According to Downes and Monten, past research on the democratizing effect of foreign-imposed regime change has overemphasized the characteristics of the intervener and underemphasized the existing preconditions for democracy in the state targeted for intervention. Rather than the FIRC itself, it is these preconditions, Downes and Monten suggest, that explain whether a given state will democratize or not. That is, their argument posits that targets of FIRC that democratize would have done so independently of the foreign intervention.
Although Downes and Monten offer promising results in support of their hypotheses, two factors should make us skeptical of the conclusions drawn from their interpretation of the evidence. First, even though Downes and Monten duly explore the efficacy of varieties of FIRC, they omit the most critical analytical category related to the dependent variable. In evaluating the ability of FIRC to produce democracy, one should focus on cases of foreign-imposed democratization (FID) where the intervener intended to replace a nondemocratic regime with a democratic one. Second, the nature of FIRC operations has changed over time in ways unaccounted for by Downes and Monten. For historical and theoretical reasons outlined in this letter, FIRC carried out before World War I looks significantly different from FIRC carried out since 1918. A closer examination of the targets of FID after World War I reveals a fairly remarkable success rate: thirteen out of seventeen targets transitioned to consolidated democracies within ten years of the intervention. Such a record should give us pause before concluding that FIRC has little or no independent effect on a state’s democratization prospects.
PDF | Replication Files | Cite
How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy-makers near elections is that of time-inconsistency. The time inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF”) and the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is the first arguably identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy
PDF | PDF with supplementary analyses | Replication Files | Cite
This research was also featured on the Empirical Studies of Conflict.
1. "Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change.” International Security. Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/2014).
Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten’s article “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign- Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization” offers important contributions to the study of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC). The authors should be commended for their use of advanced empirical methods to tackle such an important substantive question. According to Downes and Monten, past research on the democratizing effect of foreign-imposed regime change has overemphasized the characteristics of the intervener and underemphasized the existing preconditions for democracy in the state targeted for intervention. Rather than the FIRC itself, it is these preconditions, Downes and Monten suggest, that explain whether a given state will democratize or not. That is, their argument posits that targets of FIRC that democratize would have done so independently of the foreign intervention.
Although Downes and Monten offer promising results in support of their hypotheses, two factors should make us skeptical of the conclusions drawn from their interpretation of the evidence. First, even though Downes and Monten duly explore the efficacy of varieties of FIRC, they omit the most critical analytical category related to the dependent variable. In evaluating the ability of FIRC to produce democracy, one should focus on cases of foreign-imposed democratization (FID) where the intervener intended to replace a nondemocratic regime with a democratic one. Second, the nature of FIRC operations has changed over time in ways unaccounted for by Downes and Monten. For historical and theoretical reasons outlined in this letter, FIRC carried out before World War I looks significantly different from FIRC carried out since 1918. A closer examination of the targets of FID after World War I reveals a fairly remarkable success rate: thirteen out of seventeen targets transitioned to consolidated democracies within ten years of the intervention. Such a record should give us pause before concluding that FIRC has little or no independent effect on a state’s democratization prospects.
PDF | Replication Files | Cite
