Local Peace, International Builders
Direct and Indirect Localized Peace Enforcement after Ethnic Civil Wars
In the aftermath of ethnic civil wars, typically characterized by low institutional capacity and pervasive interethnic mistrust, how can international peacebuilders promote peaceful resolution of local-level disputes? My dissertation highlights two causal mechanisms for promoting peaceful outcomes: direct enforcement of violent conflict resolution and indirect support of domestic judicial institutions. I argue that unbiased peacebuilders such as the UN are more adept at direct enforcement while state interveners, often perceived as biased in favor of local ethnic groups, are more effective at indirect enforcement. Using data from a lab-in-the-field experiment, a survey experiment, field interviews, and quantitative analysis of violent event count data, I test my theory through an analysis of French and UN peacebuilding practices in Mali from 2013-2016. I supplement the in-depth analysis of Mali with a cross-national analysis of 66 ethnic civil wars and four case studies.