

Online Appendix

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A Theoretical Mechanisms

A.1 Extended Discussion of Bias Mechanism

To concretize the potential importance of perceived lack of bias to the effectiveness of international enforcement, consider the hypothetical, stylized dispute scenarios outlined in the three columns in Table A1. In each scenario, assume that a farmer, F , is engaged in a land dispute with a cattle herder, H , from a different social group and is considering whether to cooperate to find a peaceful resolution or escalate violently. In the presence of a peacekeeper, assume also that F believes that there is a nonzero probability that the peacekeeper will discover, respond, and punish violence.

Table A1: Hypothetical dispute scenarios between farmer (F) and cattle herder (H) in the presence of different international peacekeepers.

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
	No peacekeepers	UN peacekeepers	Foreign peacekeepers
F beliefs about P bias	Not applicable	Neither	Favors H
F beliefs about H payoffs from escalation	High	Low	High
F beliefs about own payoffs from escalation	High	Low	Low
F action in equilibrium	Unwilling to cooperate	Willing to cooperate	Unwilling to cooperate

In the first scenario (first column in the table), assume that there is no authority present to punish escalation from either F or H . F will believe that H will take advantage of any cooperation extended and that escalation will not be punished. Moreover, since F further believes that their own escalation will go unpunished, F will not be willing to cooperate. In the second scenario (second column, shaded), assume the presence of UN peacekeepers that F perceives to be unbiased and equally likely to punish F or H . F believes that the payoffs to escalating are low for both her and H . In this case, since F believes that peacekeepers will punish her for escalating *and* that H will reciprocate any attempts at cooperation (for fear of punishment by UN peacekeepers), F will choose to cooperate with H . In the third scenario (third column), assume the presence of foreign peacekeepers from a country that F associates with the same ethnic group of which H is a member. That is, F believes that the international peacekeeper is biased in favor of H . As a result, F believes that the peacekeeper is unlikely to punish H yet still likely to punish F for escalating the dispute. In this case, F will perceive H 's payoffs from violence to be high while her own are low. Though she still fears punishment from the peacekeeper if she escalates, F will still choose

to escalate in order to escape preventive attack from H .

A.2 Negative Effect of Unilateral Enforcement

It might be the case that states in general and not France specifically generate biased and ineffective enforcement of interethnic trust. According to this line of argumentation, unilateral interventions might generate general resentment independent of the identity-based argument I posit. In this case, we would expect (a) France to be perceived similarly to other states; (b) the UN to be more trusted than any state intervener. I test this argument by asking the same 512 respondents that played the trust game three pre-treatment questions about how much they trusted France, the United States, and the United Nations. They could give one of three answers: (a) do not trust at all; (b) trust a little; (c) trust a lot. I included the United States as a “placebo” state alongside the UN and France. I chose the United States because of its perceived status as an “imperial” power with a global footprint. That is, it should be an easy case for the unilateral mechanism and a hard case for my proposed mechanism; globally, few states are as unpopular as the United States due to unilateral interventions abroad.

The survey answers are inconsistent with both facets of the unilateral mechanism. First, respondents were both more likely *not* to trust France (41%) compared to the United States (18%) and more likely to trust the United States a lot (55%) compared to France (30%). Second, if the unilateral mechanism accounted for the enforcement effect described in this paper, we would expect respondents to register higher trust for the UN than any possible single state. However, results suggest that respondents view the United States slightly more favorably than the UN (81% trust the United States “a lot” or “a little,” 69% trust the UN “a lot” or “a little”).

And so, contrary to the expectations of this mechanism, the evidence suggests that perceptions about France cannot be attributed solely to Malian concerns about unilateral intervention.

A.3 Local Capacity

It might be the case that Malians perceive the UN as having more localized operational capacities than France. Since the central challenge to intergroup cooperation is that disputing parties are unable to commit to cooperate, as long as the peacekeeper can project enough power to enforce local-level interactions, they can help disputing parties overcome this commitment problem (Walter 2002). And it might be the case that individuals might believe that the UN is better suited to mobilize local resources to punish individual transgressions. However, the design of the experiment controls for any potential variation in beliefs about

local capacity by keeping constant across treatments the number of peacekeepers (two), the distance to the individual (“in this building”), and enforcement capability (identical fine). And so, it is unlikely that local capacity explains the difference in effect between the UN and France treatments.

A.4 UN Bias

It is possible that Malians perceive the UN as biased *against* Tuareg Malians or in favor of Malians from one of Mali’s other groups. However, it seems unlikely that a UN anti-Tuareg bias would increase the willingness of individuals to cooperate with Tuareg in the presence of UN peacekeepers since respondents would expect the UN *not* to punish them if they chose not to cooperate. In fact, the main results in this article suggest that non-Tuareg Malians are more willing to cooperate with Tuareg Malians when UN peacekeepers are present. Moreover, responses to the follow-up survey provide little evidence for this alternative mechanism. Very few respondents said that they believed the UN to favor a non-Tuareg Malian ethnic groups (e.g., Bambara, Malinke, Peulh) from which the experiment sampled. About 4% of all respondents believed the UN to be biased in favor of these groups.

A.5 UN Force Composition and Bias against Tuareg

Here, I delve deeper into the alternative explanation that the effect found in the main study of this paper is driven by perceived UN peacebuilders bias against Tuareg and/or in favor of non-Tuareg ethnic groups. I approach this explanation by looking specifically at the force composition of UN peacekeepers in Mali.

UN peacekeepers in Mali are from 41 different nationalities.¹ It is possible that the nationality of these peacekeepers rather than the general perception of UN neutrality accounts for the positive UN effect uncovered in this study. With the exception of Bangladesh, Sweden, and Netherlands, three traditionally heavy contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, the largest contributors are other sub-Saharan African states: Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and Togo (See Figure A2). Some of these states have similar identity cleavages as Mali that may lead individuals to believe that UN peacekeepers actually biased in their favor, suggestive of an entirely different mechanism than the one offered in this paper.

Because the experiment itself provides no information about the origin of the peacekeepers, if this alternative mechanism holds, we should expect the vast majority of respondents to believe that UN peacekeepers come primarily from West Africa and other states that have

¹This is solely military personnel and does not take into account the nationality of the civilian staff or police officers, though UN reports suggest that these 41 nationalities contribute the most of any type of staff.




Figure A1: MINUSMA deployment, as of September 15th, 2015. Source: UN.

similar identity cleavages. In particular, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger are the only three states with both significant Tuareg populations and peacekeepers in Mali. In the follow-up survey conducted in Bamako in July and August 2016, I asked respondents two questions related to this topic. First, I asked respondents from which part of the world they thought most peacekeepers came. The most common answer was Europe (32%). 25% said West Africa, the region that contains Mali as well as Burkina Faso and Niger.² 26% said sub-Saharan Africa, the part of the region that contains Chad. To gain more precision, I also asked them from which country they thought most UN peacekeepers were. Less than 10% answered Burkina Faso and no one said Niger. The most common answer was Chad (39.9% of all respondents).

A generous interpretation of these findings is that about half of all respondents believe

²It is widely known to Malians that all three states would belong to the same region: they share a similar colonial history, cultural demographics, and currency (the West African Franc).




Figure A2: Contributors to MINUSMA mission. Source: UN.

that peacekeepers come from a state with similar identity cleavages. Since Malians do not overwhelmingly believe that UN peacekeepers come from states with similar identity cleavages, it seems unlikely that respondents in the study’s lab experiment would condition their donations on the perceived low likelihood that UN peacekeepers would be biased in their favor. If there are 2 peacekeepers enforcing their behavior then it is likely that they believe that only 1 of them would be

Nonetheless, even if we were to assume that the respondents did believe that the UN peacekeepers in the experiment were from states with similar identity cleavages, if this mechanism were to account for the positive UN effect, we should also expect Malians to hold favorable opinions of West African peacekeepers. Observational evidence suggests that this is not the case with the UN presence in Mali. Most of the West African peacekeepers in Mali are remnants from the the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The “re-hatting”³ of AFISMA troops to MINUSMA peacekeepers has been complicated, with states failing to meet UN peacekeeping norms. Reports pervade of peacekeepers from these contributing states using child soldiers or engaging in sexual exploitation and assault of Malian women, with Chadian soldiers receiving particularly poor marks for their behavior (Bergamaschi 2013; Vermeij 2015). This evidence suggests that the African peacekeepers, rather than being perceived positively, would be perceived negatively by the population. If

³Re-hatting refers to the practice of absorbing AFISMA troops into MINUSMA and using the same troops as UN peacekeepers but with a new “hat.”

there does exist bias because Malians perceive peacekeepers in Mali as being not neutral but rather from a neighboring state, then the direction of that bias would be negative. Put simply, if Malians associate peacekeepers with a state that shares a similar identity cleavage (Niger, Burkina Faso, or Chad), then that association would likely bias the estimate of any UN enforcement effect downwards and against my findings.

A.6 Information Provision

Scholars in the mediation literature have suggested that international actors can provide social groups with information relevant to cooperation and that their ability to do so may vary depending on whether they are perceived to be biased or not (Kydd 2003; Rauchhaus 2006; Savun 2008). As I laid out in the body of the paper, it is not clear that informational asymmetries are the key barrier to local-level intergroup cooperation. In particular, international peacebuilders are not providing individuals with information about the resolve or capabilities of other individuals with whom they seek to interact or trade. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the United Nations is somehow providing more credible information than France to non-Tuareg Malians (Beber 2012).

However, I find no evidence that Malians' beliefs about the amount of information available to peacekeepers account for the effectiveness of the UN. I designed the lab experiment so that UN peacekeepers and French enforcers would have the same amount of information about the intergroup interaction. In both treatment groups, enumerators tell participants that two peacekeepers will look at the amount that they send to their Tuareg partners. For this reason, information alone cannot account for the difference in treatment effects between France and the UN. As an additional check, I asked the respondents in the follow-up survey whether they agreed with the statement that a given actor—France or the UN—knows about the problems in their village. 14.3% of respondents agree or strongly agree that France knows about village disputes compared to 12.7% for the UN. This suggests that information about disputes alone cannot explain the UN's singular ability to increase the willingness of individuals to cooperate.

However, the wording of the treatment allowed me to control for the provision of information. Specifically, the treatments do not provide different types of information about the game, the Tuareg partner, or the peacekeepers enforcing intergroup cooperation. Additionally, the treatments do not provide any information about the resolve or capabilities of the Tuareg partner. This allowed me to control for the possibility that the treatment effects are due in part to new information arising from the treatments.

A.7 High Status

Some researchers have suggested that international actors that have high status can more credibly signal their ability to coerce a disputing party to cooperate (Low 1985; Kleiboer 1996).⁴ If this were the case, however, we would expect that respondents would view both France, the former colonial power and recent intervener, and the United Nations as “high status” peacebuilders. This view would align with the existing scholarship on status and mediation, which would award France high status due to its position in the international system and in Mali specifically as a major power. As such, it is unlikely that the status mechanism explains the results in this paper since we would expect that France’s status would lead to, at worst, equal peacebuilding effectiveness as the UN. Moreover, some scholars have also shown that the benefits of status—and great power status—are contingent on bias (Svensson 2007; Favretto 2009). And, in the Malian context in which France is perceived as favoring the Tuareg, it is not clear that their high status would help persuade a non-favored group that the peacekeeper will coerce a favored group, which shares their own policy preferences.

⁴However, existing work is inconclusive with scholars providing evidence that possessing great power and high status can help (Touval 1982) or hurt (Savun 2008).

B Additional Methodological Information

B.1 Extended Research Design Discussion

Testing the argument that peacekeepers increase individual willingness to cooperate with members of outgroups requires isolating the effect of peacekeeping from two primary threats to identification. First, the effect of peacekeeping must be isolated from characteristics of the local context that may inhibit or bolster cooperation. For example, peacekeepers deploy to violent and unstable areas where intergroup cooperation is difficult to sustain, resulting in a spurious negative correlation between peacekeeping and cooperation. As Figure B1 shows, this issue is particularly severe in Mali. The panel on the left visualizes the total number of conflict events by *cercle*, the second largest administrative district in Mali, using the Armed Conflict and Event Location Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). The panel on the right visualizes the average number of UN peacekeepers deployed using the Robust Africa Deployments of Peacekeeping Operations (RADPKO) dataset (Hunnicuttt and Nomikos 2020), with darker areas indicating greater number of peacekeepers and the black dots indicating UN bases. The UN deploys to the most violent areas of Mali.

Second, the effect of peacekeeping patrols enforcing an interaction must be isolated from the effect of information generated by the circumstances surrounding that interaction. Each exchange between members of different social groups introduces new information that likely affects whether an individual will want to cooperate or not, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of this new information from the effects of peacekeeping enforcement. For instance, a cattle herder may meet several members of their community in a weekly market patrolled by peacekeepers, choosing ultimately to sell the meat from some of their cows after several peaceful interactions. Using solely observational data, we may come to the premature conclusion that the peacekeeping patrols increased the willingness of the cattle herder to cooperate. Yet, it would not be clear whether the herder cooperated because of the presence of the peacekeepers or new information about their fellow community members gathered during the weekly market.

In order to address these two threats to identification, I implemented a lab-in-the-field experiment in February and March 2016 designed to elicit cooperative behavior from non-Tuareg Malians toward Tuareg partners. In the fashion of a trust game, I tasked participants with sending a part of an initial salary to a Tuareg partner that they then had to trust would reciprocate the attempt at cooperation (Berg et al. 1995; McCabe et al. 2003). In order to address the first threat to identification, I randomly assigned participants to a control group or one of two peacekeeping treatments so that any potential characteristics of the area of the study would be independent from the effect of enforcement. If assigned to a treatment, I informed participants that a peacekeeper, either from the UN or France, would observe and fine low contributions, a common method from experimental psychology to operationalize the presence of a third-party enforcer (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Bernhard et al. 2006). To

Figure B1: Peacekeepers Deploy to the Most Violent Settings





Figure B2: Map of Neighborhoods in Bamako Sampled for the Lab Experiment



Note: *P* refers to neighborhoods sampled for pilot, numbers refer to days mobilized for the study.


deal with the second threat to identification, I kept characteristics of the interaction between the participants the same across treatment groups. Therefore, any differences between the treatment and control groups can only be attributed to the effect of the treatment groups, not new information that arises over the course of the social encounter.

B.2 Extended Sampling Discussion

I drew a sample of 512 non-Tuareg Malians from eight randomly selected neighborhoods of southeast Bamako, a semi-rural and residential part of the capital city of Mali (Figure B2). I sample from this part of Bamako to minimize the differences between Bamako and other areas of Mali. This sample is representative of residents in Bamako. However, it is not

representative of all residents of Mali in two respects. First, even in these residential areas, the proximity to the center makes life substantially different than it is for rural residents of Mali. Second, the ethnic make-up of the sample differs between Bamako and the rest of Mali, with Tuareg representing a smaller share of the population in Bamako than in Northern Mali, for instance. To the extent that this study focuses on non-Tuareg Malians, this is less of an issue.

Figure B3: Sampling procedure for lab experiment.



(a) GPS location of Site 4 (author photo)

(b) Sampling at Site 4

I randomly selected eight sets of GPS coordinates in this part of Bamako. Then I traveled to the coordinates and found the closest four-point intersection. I took pictures of the four-point intersection so that my local mobilizers could easily find it. Once at the four-point intersection, four mobilizers would move in opposite directions until they were faced with a major road or obstacle, at which point they would take a right turn (see Figure B3b). This would continue until each mobilizer recruited their daily quota. Although the mobilizers did not have a specific recruiting protocol beyond these instructions, they were told to gather subjects from diverse backgrounds.

B.3 Follow-Up Survey

The follow-up survey and interviews is not outlined in the pre-analysis plan for this study but rather are associated with a separate study. This separate study and its hypotheses are registered in a separate pre-analysis plan, which I can make available upon request.

I conducted the survey with 874 Malian respondents across 20 locations in Mali. The design

Table B1: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates between Treatments

	Mean			Difference			p-value		
	Control (C)	France (Fr)	UN	Fr-C	UN-C	Fr-UN	Fr-C	UN-C	Fr-UN
Age	26.99	26.59	26.63	-0.40	-0.37	-0.03	0.61	0.66	0.97
Female	0.12	0.11	0.09	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.77	0.36	0.45
Bambara	0.33	0.32	0.36	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.77	0.70	0.42
Bamako Native	0.53	0.50	0.52	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.70	0.93	0.72
Education (0-8)	4.71	4.73	4.71	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.94	1.00	0.93
Children	2.47	2.50	2.57	0.03	0.10	-0.06	0.81	0.49	0.60
Tuareg Friendship	0.51	0.55	0.54	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.49	0.60	0.85
UN Contact (0-4)	2.90	3.00	2.78	0.11	-0.12	0.23	0.40	0.35	0.04

of the experiment specifically investigates whether the UN lowers the likelihood that an intracommunal dispute will become violent.

I sampled respondents for the survey in two rounds. In the first round (July-August 2016), I sampled 514 respondents from 8 randomly selected neighborhoods of Bamako using the same four-corner procedure described for the lab experiment sampling. In the second round (December 2017), I sampled 360 respondents from 12 villages in the Markala and San *communes* in the Segou region of Central Mali. Because of the existence of high levels of local-level violence in Segou, the Malian government has outlawed travel by motorbike in the region. This law combined with the travel distances between villages and the lack of navigable roads in Segou made data collection much more challenging in Segou than Bamako. For this reason, I was only able to sample 360 respondents from 12 villages. Four enumerators under my supervision implemented the survey directly in the field with the questions pre-programmed into tablets.

B.4 Interviews

Interviews were conducted by a Malian field manager as part of a debriefing session after the game in French. They were recorded and transcribed by the field manager. A professional Malian translator, familiar with colloquial use of French in Mali, translated the interviews into English. Full transcriptions of all of these interviews are available upon request.

B.5 Social and Institutional Trust Measures

In order to test Hypothesis 3, I look at participants’ responses to four pre-treatment questions that measure both social trust and institutional trust. For each of the four measures, I group together all low trust participants in one category and all high trust participants in another category (see Table B2).

Table B2: Measures of Social and Institutional Trust

Question	Low Trust	High Trust
How many Tuareg Malians do you think share the opinions of [separatist] groups like the MNLA?	“About half” OR “More than half” OR “Almost all”	“Only a few” OR “Less than half”
How many Tuareg Malians do you think discriminate against other Malians?	“About half” OR “More than half” OR “Almost all”	“Only a few” OR “Less than half”
Do you know any Malian Tuareg that you would consider a close personal friend?	“No”	“Yes”
How do you feel about politicians in the national government?	“I don’t really trust them”	“I trust them a lot” OR “I trust them a little”

B.6 Research Safety and Ethical Considerations


Since the empirical strategy of the game, which focuses on the one-shot contributions of non-Tuareg Malians, did not necessitate any response from the peacekeeper, I did not invite real peacekeepers to participate in the experiment. That is, the participants did not observe any peacekeeper behavior. They are merely told that two peacekeepers from either France or the UN, depending on treatment group, will fine them if they make a low contributions. The game ends before they see the result of the fine. Peacekeepers rely on deterrence since punishing each violation is unmanageable. Having a game with anticipated rather than actual punishment thus reflects how peacekeepers use an important coercive instrument.

Additionally, I did not use real Tuareg partners because the volatile nature of intergroup relations in Mali, an active conflict setting, could have produced hostile feelings toward Tuareg players. It would have been difficult to ensure the safety of all participants if such hostilities were to escalate. Moreover, the hypotheses generate testable implications about the willingness of members of one group to cooperate with others. Because data collection did not require the involvement of the target of cooperation, it was not necessary to subject the participants of the game to risk. Finally, I made sure that the pre-programmed return

from the Tuareg at the end of the game was generous to perpetuate positive impressions of Tuareg Malians. Ultimately, all subjects received the same monetary payoff (1,500FCFA).

All participants were thoroughly debriefed after the game until it was clear that they understood the deception used in the game.

Figure C1: Game tree for the trust game in the main paper.



C Extended Analysis of Formal Model

What follows is a formal description of the game with a third party enforcer. We will model this as a two-player game where the enforcer type is randomly assigned.

$$y = \text{Non-Tuareg Player's initial contribution}$$

$$x = \text{Tuareg Player's return contribution}$$

The sequence is as follows:

1. Nature draws enforcer cut-point values $c_y \in [0, 1]$ from some distribution F_y for Non-Tuareg Player. For simplicity, assume that c_x can only take two values, c_x^{low} and c_x^{high} , with $Pr(c_x = c_x^{high}) = p_x$.
2. Nature draws enforcer cut-point values $c_x \in [0, 1]$ from some other unknown distribution F_x . For simplicity, assume that c_x can only take two values, c_x^{low} and c_x^{high} , with $Pr(c_x = c_x^{high}) = p_x$.

3. Non-Tuareg Player decides on an amount $y \in [0, 1000]$ to send to Tuareg Player.
4. If Non-Tuareg Player sends a contribution below c_y of her total endowment (that is $1000 \times c_y$), the enforcer fines her 500.
5. Whatever amount y sent to Tuareg Player is doubled to $2y$.
6. If Tuareg Player sends a contribution below c_x of her total amount (that is $2y \times c_x$), the enforcer fines her 500.
7. Tuareg Player decides on an amount $x \in [0, 2y]$ to return to Non-Tuareg Player.

This could be interpreted as different participants in the experiment might have different prior understanding of c_y , and their priors follows a distribution of F_y .

The payoffs are as follows:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y, p_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ p_y(500 - y + x) + (1 - p_y)(1000 - y + x) & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

$$u_T(y, x, c_x, p_x) = \begin{cases} 2y - x & \text{if } x \geq 2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\ 2y - x - 500 & \text{if } x < 2y \cdot c_x^{low} \\ p_x(2y - x - 500) + (1 - p_x)(2y - x) & \text{if } x \in [2y \cdot c_x^{low}, 2y \cdot c_x^{high}) \end{cases}$$

C.1 Solution: Backward Induction

Tuareg Player (Tuareg Player)

We can eliminate the following:

- $x \in (0, 2y \cdot c_x^{low})$ should never happen. Basically, give 0 if you're going to give a low amount. That maximizes your payoff.
- $x \in (2y \cdot c_x^{high}, 1]$ should never happen because $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$ avoids the fine. No need to give extra money.

- $x \in (2y \cdot c_x^{low}, 2y \cdot c_x^{high})$ should never happen either. For *any* value larger than the low cut-off ($2y \cdot c_x^{low}$) but smaller than the high cut-off ($2y \cdot c_x^{high}$), you're going to get fined with the same probability. So you should choose $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$ to max payoff.

So we're really just comparing between three possible values: 0, $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$, and $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$. Intuition: You might want to give 0 if you want to send a low amount and are fine with taking a fine. You'd want to give $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$ if you're reasonably confident that you have a low type and can avoid fine. You'd want to give $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$ if you're reasonably confident that you have a high type and can't avoid fine.

Expected value of giving $x = 0$: $2y - 500$

Expected value of giving $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$: $2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Expected value of giving $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & p_x(2y - x - 500) + (1 - p_x)(2y - x) \\
 & p_x(2y) - p_x(x) - p_x(500) + 2y - x - 2y(p_x) + p_x(x) \\
 & 2y - x - p_x(500) \\
 & 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x
 \end{aligned}$$

Re-writing:

$$u_T(y, x, c_x, p_x) = \begin{cases} 2y - 500 & \text{if } x = 0 \\ 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} & \text{if } x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\ 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x & \text{if } x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low} \end{cases}$$

1. When should Tuareg Player give nothing ($y = 0$)?

(a) Does giving 0 result in greater payoff than giving $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$?

$$\begin{aligned}
 2y - 500 &> 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\
 -500 &> -2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\
 2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> 500 \\
 y \cdot c_x^{high} &> 250 \\
 y &> \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}
 \end{aligned}$$

(b) Does giving 0 result in greater payoff than giving $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$?

$$\begin{aligned}
2y - 500 &> 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x \\
-500 &> -2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x \\
2y \cdot c_x^{low} &> 500 - 500p_x \\
y \cdot c_x^{low} &> \frac{500 - 500p_x}{2} \\
y &> \frac{250 - 250p_x}{c_x^{low}} \\
y &> \frac{250(1 - p_x)}{c_x^{low}}
\end{aligned}$$

2. When should Tuareg Player give $y = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$ s?

(a) Does giving $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$ result in greater payoff than giving $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$?

$$\begin{aligned}
2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x &> 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\
-2y \cdot c_x^{low} &> 500p_x - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} \\
2y \cdot c_x^{high} - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} &> 500p_x \\
2y(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low}) &> 500p_x \\
2y &> \frac{500p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})} \\
y &> \frac{250p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}
\end{aligned}$$

(b) Does giving $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$ result in greater payoff than giving 0?

$$\begin{aligned}
2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x &> 2y - 500 \\
-2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x &> -500 \\
-2y \cdot c_x^{low} &> 500p_x - 500 \\
-y \cdot c_x^{low} &> 250p_x - 250 \\
y \cdot c_x^{low} &< 250 - 250p_x \\
y &< \frac{250 - 250p_x}{c_x^{low}} \\
y &< \frac{250(1 - p_x)}{c_x^{low}}
\end{aligned}$$

3. When should Tuareg Player give $y = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$?

(a) Does giving $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$ result in greater payoff than giving $2y \cdot c_x^{low}$?

$$\begin{aligned}
2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> 2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x \\
-2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> -2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 500p_x \\
2y \cdot c_x^{low} - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> -500p_x \\
2y \cdot c_x^{high} - 2y \cdot c_x^{low} &< 500p_x \\
2y(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low}) &< 500p_x \\
y &< \frac{250p_x}{c_x^{high} - c_x^{low}}
\end{aligned}$$

(b) Does giving $2y \cdot c_x^{high}$ result in greater payoff than giving 0?

$$\begin{aligned}
2y - 2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> 2y - 500 \\
-2y \cdot c_x^{high} &> -500 \\
2y \cdot c_x^{high} &< 500 \\
y &< \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}
\end{aligned}$$

In short, we can write the best response function as follows:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{250p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise, $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

C.2 UN Treatment

Let's conceptualize a treatment as changing values of p_x (probability that enforcement of x has a high cutpoint). In other words, if you're assigned UN peacekeepers as enforcers with $p_x = p_x^{UN}$, probability that enforcer is a high type will be greater than if assigned to France with $p_x = p_x^{France}$.

Tuareg Player (UN Treatment)

Let's assume that $p_x^{UN} = 1$ and re-write best response functions:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{0}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{0}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{250}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $c_x^{low} = 0$, which is a reasonable assumption. Let's assume that $c_x^{low} = 0 + \epsilon$ so that we don't have 0 in denominator.

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{0}{0+\epsilon} = 0$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{0}{0+\epsilon} = 0$ and $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high} - 0 + \epsilon}$ then $x = 2y \cdot 0 = 0$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $c_x^{high} - 0 + \epsilon \approx c_x^{high}$.

So, if $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ then T should give nothing. Otherwise, she should give $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$.

Non-Tuareg Player (UN Treatment)

Recall M 's utility function:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y, p_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ p_y(500 - y + x) + (1 - p_y)(1000 - y + x) & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Let's assume that $p_y = 1$ and re-write:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}] \end{cases}$$

Let's also assume that $c_y^{low} = 0$:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}] \end{cases}$$

Recall the best responses for T is $x = 0$ if $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$ otherwise. Let's assume that $c_x^{high} = c_y^{high} = c^{high}$. There are three cases possible: (1) $\frac{250}{c^{high}} = 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$ ($c^{high} = 0.5$), (2) $\frac{250}{c^{high}} < 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$ ($c^{high} < 0.5$), and (3) $\frac{250}{c^{high}} > 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$ ($c^{high} > 0.5$). Let's re-write each, starting with $c^{high} = 0.5$.

Case 1: $c^{high} = 0.5 \rightarrow \frac{250}{c^{high}} = 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 500 \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in (500, 500) \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, 500] \end{cases}$$

Since we know x for each of these domains, we can further re-write:

$$u_M(y, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y & \text{if } y \geq 500 \\ 500 & \text{if } y \in [0, 500] \end{cases}$$

Expected value of giving $y = 0$ is 500 and the expected value of giving $y = 500$ so M will be indifferent between the 0 and 500.

Case 2: $c^{high} > 0.5 \rightarrow \frac{250}{c^{high}} < 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in (\frac{250}{c^{high}}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, \frac{250}{c^{high}}] \end{cases}$$

Since we know x for each of these domains, we can further re-write:

$$u_M(y, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c^{high} \\ 500 - y & \text{if } y \in (\frac{250}{c^{high}}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \\ 500 - y + 2y \cdot c_x^{high} & \text{if } y \in [0, \frac{250}{c^{high}}] \end{cases}$$

Within this range of values, we can eliminate the following values:

- $y \in (1000 \cdot c^{high}, 1000]$ will never be chosen. We know that M will choose the lowest possible y if $y \geq 1000 \cdot c^{high}$ to maximize payoff.
- $y \in (\frac{250}{c^{high}}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high})$. Payoff is higher if she gives the lowest possible amount or highest possible amount.
- $y \in (0, \frac{250}{c^{high}})$. Give 0 or the largest possible value $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$ if you're going to take this payoff.

So we are left with three possible values: $1000 \cdot c^{high}$, 0, or $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$.

Expected value of giving $y = 0$ is 500.

Expected value of giving $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$ is $1000 - \frac{250}{c^{high}}$

$$\begin{aligned}
& 500 - \frac{250}{c^{high}} + 2 \cdot \frac{250}{c^{high}} \cdot c^{high} \\
& 500 - \frac{250}{c^{high}} + 2 \cdot 250 \\
& 500 - \frac{250}{c^{high}} + 500 \\
& 1000 - \frac{250}{c^{high}}
\end{aligned}$$

Expected value of giving $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ is $1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high}$.

Since $c^{high} > 0.5$, we know the following:

- $\frac{250}{c^{high}} < 500$.
- $1000 - \frac{250}{c^{high}} > 500$. Payoff from $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$ better than payoff from 0.
- $1000 \cdot c^{high} > \frac{250}{c^{high}}$.
- $1000 - \frac{250}{c^{high}} > 1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high}$. Payoff from $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$ better than payoff from $1000 \cdot c^{high}$.

So M should choose $\frac{250}{c^{high}}$ if $c^{high} > 0.5$

Case 3: $c^{high} < 0.5 \rightarrow \frac{250}{c^{high}} > 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y > \frac{250}{c^{high}} \\ 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{high}, \frac{250}{c^{high}}] \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Since we know x for each of these domains, we can further re-write:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y & \text{if } y > \frac{250}{c^{high}} \\ 1000 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high} & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{high}, \frac{250}{c^{high}}] \\ 500 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high} & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Within this range of values, we can eliminate the following values:

- $y \in (\frac{250}{c^{high}}, 1000]$ will never be chosen. We know that M will choose the lowest possible y if $y > \frac{250}{c^{high}}$ to maximize payoff.
- $y \in (1000 \cdot c_y^{high}, \frac{250}{c^{high}}]$. Payoff is higher if she gives either end point.
- $y \in (0, 1000 \cdot c^{high})$. Payoff is larger at 0 or either endpoint.

So we are left with two possible values: $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ or 0.

Expected value of giving $y = 0$ is $500 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high}$.

Expected value of giving $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ is $1000 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high}$.

$$\begin{aligned} & 1000 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high} \\ 1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high} + 2 \cdot 1000 \cdot c^{high} \cdot c^{high} \end{aligned}$$

When should M give $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ instead of 0?

$$\begin{aligned} 1000 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high} &> 500 \\ 1000 - y + 2y \cdot c^{high} &> 500 \\ 2y \cdot c^{high} &> y - 500 \\ y \cdot c^{high} &> \frac{y}{2} - 250 \\ c^{high} &> \frac{1}{2} - \frac{250}{y} \end{aligned}$$

Since $c^{high} < 0.5$, we know that $y = 1000 \cdot c^{high}$ is at its largest never 500. That means that $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{250}{y} < 0$, which means that M give $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ when $c^{high} < 0.5$.

Best Response

Now we can write the best response function:

1. If $c^{high} > \frac{1}{2}$ then $y = \frac{250}{c^{high}}$
2. If $c^{high} < \frac{1}{2}$ then $y = 1000 \cdot c^{high}$
3. If $c^{high} = \frac{1}{2}$ then M is indifferent between $\frac{250}{c^{high}} = 1000 \cdot c^{high} = 500$ and 0.

C.3 France Treatment

Tuareg Player (France Treatment)

Recall Tuareg Player's best response function:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{250p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $p_x^{France} = 0$ and re-write best response functions:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{0}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})} = 0$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $c_x^{low} = 0 + \epsilon$ so that we don't have 0 in denominator.

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250}{\epsilon}$ then $x = 0$

2. If $y < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$ and $y > \frac{0}{(c_x^{high} - \epsilon)} = 0$ then $x = 2y \cdot \epsilon$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $y < 1000 < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. Let's also assume that $2y \cdot \epsilon \approx 0$. And so y will never fulfill $y > \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. However, y will always fulfill $y < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. The best response will then always be $x \approx 0$

Non-Tuareg Player (France Treatment)

Recall M 's utility function:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y, p_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ p_y(500 - y + x) + (1 - p_y)(1000 - y + x) & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Let's assume that $p_y = 1$ and re-write:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Let's also assume that $c_y^{low} = 0$:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Recall the best responses for T was 0 at all values of y . So we can rewrite Non-Tuareg Player's utility function accordingly.

$$u_M(y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Within this range of values, we can eliminate the following values:

- $y \in (1000 \cdot c^{high}, 1000]$ will never be chosen. We know that M will choose the lowest possible y if $y \geq 1000 \cdot c^{high}$ to maximize payoff.
- $y \in (0, 1000 \cdot c^{high})$. Give 0 going to take the fine.

So we are left with two possible values: 0 and $1000 \cdot c^{high}$

Expected value of giving $y = 0$ is 500.

Expected value of giving $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ is $1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high}$.

1. When does giving 0 result in greater payoff than giving $1000 \cdot c^{high}$?

$$\begin{aligned} 500 &> 1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high} \\ 1000 \cdot c^{high} &> 500 \\ c^{high} &> \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

2. When does giving $1000 \cdot c^{high}$ result in greater payoff than giving 0?

$$\begin{aligned} 1000 - 1000 \cdot c^{high} &> 500 \\ -1000 \cdot c^{high} &> -500 \\ 1000 \cdot c^{high} &< 500 \\ c^{high} &< \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

We can re-write the best response as follows:

1. $y = 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}$ if $c_y^{high} < \frac{1}{2}$
2. $y = 0$ if $c_y^{high} > \frac{1}{2}$
3. If $c_y^{high} = \frac{1}{2}$ then M is indifferent between $y = 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} = 500$ and 0 .

C.4 Control

Tuareg Player (Control)

Recall Tuareg Player's best response function:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{250p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $p_x = 0$ and re-write best response functions:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{0}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})} = 0$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $c_x^{low} = 0 + \epsilon$ so that we don't have 0 in denominator.

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250}{\epsilon}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$ and $y > \frac{0}{(c_x^{high} - \epsilon)} = 0$ then $x = 2y \cdot \epsilon$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $y < 1000 < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. Let's also assume that $2y \cdot \epsilon \approx 0$. And so y will never fulfill $y > \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. However, y will always fulfill $y < \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. The best response will then always be $x \approx 0$.

Non-Tuareg Player (Control)

Recall M 's utility function:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y, p_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ p_y(500 - y + x) + (1 - p_y)(1000 - y + x) & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Let's assume that $p_y = 0$ and re-write:

$$u_M(y, x, c_y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 500 - y + x & \text{if } y < 1000 \cdot c_y^{low} \\ 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [1000 \cdot c_y^{low}, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$


Let's also assume that $c_y^{low} = 0$:

$$u_M(y, x) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 1000 - y + x & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Recall the best responses for T was 0 at all values of y . So we can rewrite Non-Tuareg Player's utility function accordingly.

$$u_M(y) = \begin{cases} 1000 - y & \text{if } y \geq 1000 \cdot c_y^{high} \\ 1000 - y & \text{if } y \in [0, 1000 \cdot c_y^{high}) \end{cases}$$

Figure C2: Non-Tuareg Expected Behavior under Different Size Cut-points



Note: Light grey area (α) indicates greater UN-enforced cooperation relative to control (no enforcement). Dark grey area (β) indicates greater UN-enforced cooperation relative to France and control.

Given that the payoff for all values of y is $1000 - y$, M should give nothing or $y = 0$.

C.5 Relaxing Assumptions about French and UN Bias

Recall Tuareg Player's best response function:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{250(1-p_x)}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{250p_x}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $p_x^{France} = 0.5$ and re-write best response functions:

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{125}{c_x^{low}}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{125}{c_x^{low}}$ and $y > \frac{125}{(c_x^{high} - c_x^{low})}$ then $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{low}$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $c_x^{low} = 0 + \epsilon$ so that we don't have 0 in denominator.

1. If $y > \frac{250}{c_x^{high}}$ and $y > \frac{125}{\epsilon}$ then $x = 0$
2. If $y < \frac{125}{\epsilon}$ and $y > \frac{125}{(c_x^{high} - \epsilon)} = 0$ then $x = 2y \cdot \epsilon$
3. Otherwise $x = 2y \cdot c_x^{high}$

Let's assume that $y < 1000 < \frac{125}{\epsilon}$. Let's also assume that $2y \cdot \epsilon \approx 0$. We know that y will always fulfill $y < \frac{125}{\epsilon}$ and will never fulfill $y > \frac{250}{\epsilon}$. The question is when will $y > \frac{125}{(c_x^{high} - \epsilon)} = 0$. Assume that $c_x^{high} - \epsilon \approx c_x^{high}$. Then that means that when $y > \frac{125}{c_x^{high}}$, France will lead to different Tuareg behavior than UN. In other words when $y \leq \frac{125}{c_x^{high}}$, France is equivalent to the UN.

The greater c_x^{high} is, the lower the likelihood that France is like the UN, as the main model shows. Let's assume $p_x^{France} = 0.2$ so France is more unlikely to punish the Tuareg than before. Then that means that when $y > \frac{50}{c_x^{high}}$, France will lead to different Tuareg behavior than UN. This occurs for nearly all participants.


In brief, this shows that the difference between France and the UN lies entirely in the p_x parameter. As p_x^{UN} and p_x^{France} converge, the higher the likelihood that the Tuareg player will not reciprocate cooperation and, in turn, the non-Tuareg player will not be willing to cooperate. However, as long $p_x^{France} < p_x^{UN}$, the UN will be more likely to sustain Tuareg cooperation. Indeed, this is the point of the main argument in the body of the paper.

D Robustness Checks

D.1 Adjusting for Potential Imbalance in Contact with UN

I adjust for a potential imbalance in contact with the UN in the UN and France treatment groups by adjusting for whether individuals say they see UN peacekeepers. I present the estimates in Figure D1 below.


Figure D1: Average Amount Sent to Tuareg Partner, by Treatment (Adjusting for UN Contact)



D.2 Analysis by Self-Reported Gender

I present here an analysis by gender. Unfortunately, only 10% or 52 of the full sample was female, producing great imprecision in the estimates. Although it appears that there is no difference in willingness to cooperate across the three treatment groups, it may just be the case that the sample size in each group is just too small.

Figure D2: Average Amount Sent to Tuareg Partner, by Treatment (Women Only)



D.3 Balance Checks for Trust Subgroups

The following tables list balance statistics across the four measures of trust used in the main text.

Table D1: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates for Trust (Tuareg Support Separatists)

	Mean		Difference	
	High Trust	Low Trust	Difference	p-value
Age	26.57	26.78	-0.21	0.75
Female	0.08	0.13	-0.05	0.06
Bambara	0.31	0.36	-0.04	0.29
Bamako Native	0.53	0.51	0.02	0.68
Education (0-8)	4.82	4.62	0.21	0.30
Children	2.46	2.57	-0.11	0.29
UN Trust (0-2)	1.11	1.00	0.11	0.13
Adults Mix (0-2)	0.87	0.67	0.20	0.00
Neighborhood Makeup	0.67	0.73	-0.06	0.27
Rebelviolence	0.58	0.53	0.04	0.32

Table D2: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates for Trust (Has Close Tuareg Friend)

	Mean		Difference	
	High Trust	Low Trust	Difference	p-value
Age	26.68	26.70	-0.02	0.97
Female	0.07	0.14	-0.08	0.01
Bambara	0.34	0.33	0.01	0.76
Bamako Native	0.52	0.50	0.02	0.69
Education (0-8)	5.01	4.41	0.60	0.00
Children	2.46	2.61	-0.15	0.18
UN Trust (0-2)	1.02	1.10	-0.08	0.28
Adults Mix (0-2)	0.98	0.52	0.46	0.00
Neighborhood Makeup	0.82	0.58	0.24	0.00
Rebelviolence	0.60	0.51	0.09	0.04

Table D3: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates for Trust (Believes Tuareg Are Biased)

	Mean		Difference	
	High Trust	Low Trust	Difference	p-value
Age	26.14	27.06	-0.92	0.15
Female	0.09	0.11	-0.02	0.41
Bambara	0.31	0.35	-0.04	0.36
Bamako Native	0.52	0.51	0.01	0.77
Education (0-8)	4.88	4.61	0.27	0.18
Children	2.33	2.65	-0.31	0.00
UN Trust (0-2)	1.13	1.00	0.13	0.08
Adults Mix (0-2)	0.86	0.70	0.16	0.02
Neighborhood Makeup	0.68	0.72	-0.04	0.41
Rebelviolence	0.58	0.54	0.04	0.38

Table D4: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates for Trust (Trust in Government)

	Mean		Difference	
	High Trust	Low Trust	Difference	p-value
Age	26.64	26.81	-0.17	0.72
Female	0.12	0.09	0.03	0.33
Bambara	0.34	0.34	0.00	0.77
Bamako Native	0.49	0.60	-0.12	0.00
Education (0-8)	4.69	4.66	0.03	0.55
Children	2.55	2.48	0.07	0.41
UN Trust (0-2)	1.22	0.77	0.45	0.00
Adults Mix (0-2)	0.77	0.74	0.03	0.55
Neighborhood Mix (0-2)	0.69	0.69	0.00	0.54
Victimization	0.54	0.58	-0.04	0.25

I adjust for the respective variables listed in the table below for each regression.

Table D5: Summary of imbalance across four measures of trust.

Measure of Low Trust	Characteristics imbalanced
1. All Tuareg support separatists	Sees Tuareg and non-Tuareg mix
2. All Tuareg are biased against other ethnicities	Sees Tuareg and non-Tuareg mix, Number of children
3. Does not have Tuareg friend	Sees Tuareg and non-Tuareg mix, lives in neighborhood with different ethnicities, victimized by Tuareg rebel group, self-reported gender, education
4. Does not trust government	Bamako native, trust of UN

D.4 Balance Checks for UN Contact

Table D6: Summary Statistics and Balance on Demographic Covariates for UN Contact

	Mean				Difference				p-value
	Low	Medium	High	Med-Low	High-Low	Medium-High	Med-Low	High-Low	
Age	26.57	26.27	27.14	-0.30	0.57	-0.87	0.95	0.91	0.18
Female	0.14	0.14	0.07	-0.01	-0.08	0.07	0.97	0.61	0.01
Bambara	0.57	0.35	0.31	-0.22	-0.26	0.04	0.32	0.25	0.34
Bamako Native	0.14	0.53	0.51	0.39	0.37	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.67
Education (0-8)	4.14	4.55	4.91	0.41	0.77	-0.36	0.73	0.52	0.07
Children	2.14	2.54	2.51	0.40	0.37	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.81
UN Trust (0-2)	0.86	1.09	1.02	0.23	0.16	0.07	0.52	0.65	0.33
Adults Mix (0-2)	0.43	0.72	0.82	0.29	0.40	-0.11	0.37	0.24	0.10
Neighborhood Makeup	0.43	0.66	0.76	0.23	0.33	-0.10	0.31	0.15	0.04
Rebelviolence	0.00	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.98

E List of Peacekeeping Operations

Though not all peacekeeping operations have mandates to enforce peaceful interactions, local patrols are increasingly a common feature of UN, regional, and unilateral peacekeeping operations. This includes 10 different UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 21st century: Democratic Republic of Congo (1999-Present), Sierra Leone (1999-2005), Liberia (2003-2018), Cote d'Ivoire (2004-2017), Sudan (2005-2011), Darfur (2007-Present), Chad and Central African Republic (2007-2010), South Sudan (2011-Present), Mali (2013-Present), Central African Republic (2014-Present).

F Pre-Analysis Plan

F.1 Reproduced Anonymized Version of Pre-Analysis Plan

The following pre-analysis plan was pre-registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) in February 2016. I begin by reproducing the pre-registered pre-analysis plan in its entirety and then discussing the deviations from the plan.

Introduction

Can international actors bolster interethnic trust and cooperation in conflict and post-conflict environments? In such multi-ethnic settings, citizens are more likely to trust citizens of another ethnicity if some form of enforcement exists to punish violations of trust.⁵ Such enforcement typically comes from in-group policing or domestic security authorities.⁶ However, in war-torn, developing states, authorities often lack the capacity to enforce cooperation. International peacebuilders may attempt to substitute for this capacity deficit in the short to medium term.⁷ But do such attempts actually succeed?

To answer this question, I draw upon fieldwork conducted in Mali, a state with an ongoing ethnic conflict begun by Tuareg separatists in the northern part of the country. Mali is a difficult test of any peacebuilding theory focusing on interethnic trust and cooperation for several reasons. As one of sub-Saharan Africa's poorest and most underdeveloped states, Malian authorities lack the institutional capacity to enforce violations of interethnic trust. Moreover, the perpetual salience of the Tuareg separatist conflict—it has occurred four times since Mali's independence: 1963, 1990, 2006, and 2012—makes interethnic cooperation a difficult proposition in Malian communities.

I argue that the United Nations, as a multilateral peace enforcing entity, is perceived as a neutral enforcer. By contrast, non-Tuareg Malians believe that France, perceived as favoring the Tuareg due to a long legacy of cooperating with the Tuareg, can only provide biased enforcement in favor of Tuareg Malians. As a result, French peace enforcement will be less effective than UN peace enforcement.

The paper marshals three types of evidence in support of the argument. First, the paper presents the results of a lab-in-the-field experiment. In this experiment, Malians from one of the dominant Southern ethnic groups (e.g., Mande, Peul, Soninke, Songhai) are recruited to play trust games in which they are tasked with sending money to anonymous Tuareg residents of their communities, trusting that the Tuareg participants will send a generous allocation back. The experiment randomly assigns international peace enforcers (control, UN, or France), who the participants are told will punish low contributions from either side with a fine. Additionally, in order to explore more precisely attitudes toward international peacebuilders, I also present evidence from an endorsement experiment embedded within a larger survey designed to elicit indirectly respondents' opinions of international actors. Finally, I complement the experimental evidence with in-depth interviews of Malians from different ethnic groups.

⁵Some scholars have also posited that interethnic cooperation is likely to increase in the presence of a cross-cutting identity group such as class or nation (Shayo 2009; Charnysh et al. 2015). However, as Sambanis and Shayo (2013) show, conflict can harden subnational cleavages and polarize populations, increasing further the need for external enforcement of trust.

⁶Fearon and Laitin (1996).

⁷Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

In this pre-analysis plan, I outline the hypotheses derived from my theory as well as the research strategy for the trust game and post-game survey questionnaire to be implemented in February 2016.

Motivation

This paper makes three contributions to the study of international peacebuilding.

First, the paper offers a novel theory about the effectiveness of local peacebuilding, which aims to improve our understanding of how international actors can help build order in conflict-torn states. An emerging consensus from both policy practitioners and academics claims that a localized focus is critical to the success of peacebuilding missions. In the most influential scholarly articulation of this sentiment, [Autesserre \(2010\)](#) argues that the UN's failures in the Democratic Republic of Congo lay in large part in the organization's privileging of national over local conflict dynamics. In recent years, the UN has, for its part, ostensibly recognized the importance of local conflict dynamics, at least in word if not in deed. However, these accounts offer little in terms of arguments and empirical evidence about how localized efforts actually work to build peace.

Second, the paper presents direct, micro-level evidence of a theoretical belief, long held by academics and practitioners alike, that international actors can catalyze interethnic trust through enforcement. Existing research focuses on macro-level effects that miss critical, micro-level variation occurring within communities comprised of different ethnic groups. In a landmark study, [Walter \(2002\)](#) argues that third parties can use their resources to solve commitment problems that may spur renewed conflict.⁸ [Fortna \(2008\)](#) argues that international peacebuilders can preserve peace through two related mechanisms: by raising the costs of violating a peace agreement and by deterring one ethnic group from renegeing on a peace agreement. An exception to this general trend in the literature, [Mironova and Whitt \(2015\)](#) show that the presence of NATO peacekeepers can increase trust between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. However, their study focuses on a "cold," post-conflict setting within the context of a relatively developed state and region with relatively low ethnic fractionalization. It is not clear that their results generalize to the type of ethnic conflicts that currently pervade the globe, especially in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions in which new conflicts overwhelmingly begin.

Third, the paper highlights the variable effectiveness of different types of international peacebuilders under different conditions, demonstrating that not all international actors are equally effective at the same peacebuilding tasks. Scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the identity of international actors when estimating the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations, without consensus. Some have suggested that variation in peace-

⁸See also [Fearon \(1998\)](#) for an articulation of the role of commitment problems in ethnic conflict.

building effectiveness may be attributed in part to the differing strengths and weaknesses of the type of international actor.⁹ In a review of theoretical and empirical work comparing UN peacekeeping operations to those led by regional organizations, [Heldt \(2004\)](#) concludes that there is no difference in effectiveness between the two and that they are, essentially, “substitutable.” However, [Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl \(2007\)](#) show that UN-led PKOs have more effectively kept the peace than non-UN led PKOs. They suggest that in empirical work on peacebuilding effectiveness, the highly positive record of the UN drives the finding that any PKO, regardless of the identity of the intervener, has a positive and independent effect on peace obtaining (e.g., [Fortna \(2004\)](#)). Surveying the literature, [Fortna and Howard \(2008\)](#) conclude that “clearly, more research is needed on [different peacekeepers], particularly research that disaggregates non-UN missions (p. 291).” This study endeavors to fill that very gap.

Research Questions

The project specifically addresses the following questions:

1. Do international actors increase interethnic trust in a conflict/post-conflict setting?
2. Are peacekeepers from the UN more effective than peacekeepers from a state?
3. Is international peace enforcement more effective in relatively high or relatively low trust environments?
4. Is increased contact with international actors associated with higher levels of trust in those peacekeepers?

Setting: Conflict/Post-Conflict Mali

History of Interethnic Relations in Mali

From the very inception of Mali as a state until the present, relations between the Tuareg ethnic minority, numbering about 1.5 million primarily in the northern part of the country, and Mali’s dominant southern ethnic groups have pervaded Malian politics.¹⁰ Shortly before

⁹[Bellamy and Williams \(2005\)](#); [Durch and Berkman \(2006\)](#).

¹⁰Paradoxically, observers have often noted the lack of salience of ethnic divisions in Malian politics. Most recently, [Dunning and Harrison \(2010\)](#) have argued that the presence of cross-cutting cleavages due to cousinage has tempered the salience of ethnic divisions in Mali. While this may indeed be true of elite-level central politics in Mali, it is clearly not true of the rest of political life in Mali, as I discuss here. In particular, their study is based upon interactions among non-Tuareg Malians in Bamako, not non-Tuareg-Tuareg interaction in multiethnic communities in and outside of Bamako.




Figure F1: The full extent of armed group-occupied territory in Mali before French intervention.

independence from France in 1960, the Malian central government promised the Tuareg their own independent state, also known as “Azawad.” Not only did Mali’s independence not bring about this state, but the new government sought to transform political life in the North in order to align with the aforementioned Mande Malian vision of the state. Malian leaders emphasized the majority ethnic group Mande’s culture and history, even taking the name of the new state from the legendary, pre-colonial Mande-based Mali Empire. From education to the arts, Malian society became Mande society. Largely in response to these grievances, the leaders of the Tuareg clan confederation Kel Adagh launched the first Tuareg rebellion against the government in 1963, which was brutally put down by Malian military.

After intermittent fighting with little progress for most of the independence period, the Tuareg launched a second full-scale rebellion in 1990, which resulted in the 1991 Tamanrasset settlement and the 1992 National Pact, though the fighting ended only in earnest in 1996. These accords were meant to ensure the gradual decentralization of authority away from Bamako, the capital in the South, toward the Tuareg in the North. However, the government failed to integrate fully the Tuareg politically, focusing instead on integration of Tuareg into Mali’s military during the 1990s and early 2000s. These power-sharing policies largely failed and in 2006, the Tuareg started a third revolt. This revolt did not escalate due to the rise of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), against which the Tuareg and government allied.

In 2011, after fighters returned from the civil war in Libya with more arms and experience, the Tuareg formed a new liberation movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which took charge of the Tuareg rebellion. Bolstered by leadership ties and weaponry from Libya, the MNLA turned against the government and allied with Malian Islamist groups—primarily Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a more radical organization known for using terror tactics like suicide bombings—and AQIM to escalate the war against the government in the North in January 2012.

From January to March 2012, the very same Tuareg military units that were supposed to integrate with government forces in the north led mutinies against and desertion from the Malian army, which quickly found itself undergunned and outnumbered in the North. Many Tuareg in the Malian military defected to the MNLA. After a string of rebel victories, low-ranking Malian soldiers in the South, fed-up with the losses and what they perceived to be a lack of resources devoted to putting down the Tuareg uprising, overthrew the government on March 21, 2012. The coup threw Mali into internal disarray, with its military leaders struggling to maintain order. Within a few weeks of the coup, the MNLA, taking full advantage of the disorder, seized control of northern Mali. A short time thereafter, in June 2012, the Islamist groups in Mali split from the MNLA and took over the same areas in the north, paying off some MNLA fighters or overwhelming others with superior war-fighting resources. In the fall of 2012, Mali was effectively partitioned with the government only controlling the South and the North under full rebel control.

In late 2012, Islamists invaded the central Malian region of Segou, located just north of the capital of Bamako. Though the Islamists fled following a French military intervention in January 2013, corrupt rule, underprovision of social services, and damaged infrastructure lingered as critical governance issues even as the government consolidated intervention gains into peace. As the Islamist attack on the Radisson Blu in Bamako on November 20th, 2015 demonstrates, peace remains fragile. Although the major Tuareg (i.e., non-Islamist) armed groups signed a peace accord in June 2015, fighting continues in the North and Southerners express frequent frustration with the separatist movement. The Malian government continues to categorically deny the right to a separate Tuareg state. As the Malian minister for national reconciliation said on the eve of the signing of the agreement: “the people of Azawad [the Tuareg state] as an entity does not exist. This concept does not exist.” By contrast, for Tuareg Malians, post-colonial governance by the central Bamako government—seen as dominated by the Mande ethnic groups—is often contrasted (negatively) to colonial French rule.

The Role of France in Malian Society

The French conquered the territory of present-day Mali in the late 19th century, with the first major victory coming in 1888 and the final victory over the Tuareg in the North in

1894. The French governed via indirect rule, delegating most administrative responsibilities to traditional authorities in the South and granting significant autonomy to Tuareg tribal leadership in the North. The transition from a French colony to an independent Republic of Mali was slow and gradual rather than quick and definitive. Throughout its colonial history, the French relied on Malian soldiers from the South to serve in its campaigns abroad—in World War I, World War II, Indochina, Algeria. Though independence was peaceful, Malians continue to perceive of this military service as a “blood debt” that France has yet to repay to Mali.¹¹

The invited French intervention in 2013 can only be viewed properly in the context of this perceived blood debt. After inaction from the international community and ineffective responses to the northern rebels from the Malian government and its West African allies, particularly ECOWAS, the Malian government invited France to intervene in Mali in response to Islamist advances to the South. Specifically, it appears to have been the Islamist seizure of Konna, near Mopti and the strategic military base at Sevare, that proved to be the final straw. Mali became a French colony in 1892 and gained its independence in 1960.¹² In 2013, the French were back. Initially, they used a combination of air power and special forces and then then a force of 2,500 troops to stabilize the south and restore government control over the North all under the specter of Operation Serval.¹³ Most of the initial fighting ended by April 2013. However, the French remain in Mali, engaging in counter-terrorism operations and seeking to root out pockets of Islamist resistance remaining in hard-to-reach areas of the North.

MINUSMA: UN Peacebuilding in Mali

In response to the initial fighting between the government and the MNLA rebels, Security Council Resolution 2085 established the United Nations Missions in Mali (UNOM) on December 20th 2012, meant primarily to support the African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA). After the French intervention, both UNOM and AFISMA, were subsumed into the new United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established by Security Council Resolution 2100 of April 2013. The resolution authorized a multi-dimensional peacekeeping force of 11,200 military personnel to use all necessary means to re-establish and maintain order in Mali. This mission remains in place as of January 2016.

¹¹Mann (2006).

¹²Seay (2013).

¹³Nossiter et al. (2013).




Figure F2: MINUSMA deployment, as of September 15th, 2015. Source: UN.

Theory

Main Hypotheses: Identity and International Enforcement of Interethnic Trust

I argue that international actors have a positive effect on interethnic trust. However, I suggest that this effect is mediated through the identity of the international actor. That is, different international actors have different levels of effectiveness. And so, I test my hypotheses against both the sharp null and null hypotheses:

Hypothesis Sharp Null International enforcement has no effect on interethnic trust.

Hypothesis A Null The identity of the enforcer has no effect on interethnic trust.

More precisely, I theorize that the identity of the peace enforcer functions as a signal for the citizen of the bias of the peace enforcer. Whether real or imagined, the perceived bias of the peace enforcer can affect the real behavior of individuals suspicious of cooperation with members of another ethnic group.

	Neutral	Non-neutral
Colonial	n/a	France: high bias signal/low enforcement effectiveness
Non-Colonial	UN: low bias signal/high enforcement effectiveness	Other states (e.g., United Kingdom, United States): middling bias signal

Table F1: Identity signals for biased enforcement.

In this study, I look at the effect of two identity-based signals: neutrality and colonial history. Neutrality produces a signal of low bias while colonial history marks the international actor as highly biased. I hypothesize that the UN, as a multilateral peace enforcing entity, is perceived as a neutral enforcer. By contrast, non-Tuareg Malians will believe that France, perceived as favoring the Tuareg, can only provide biased enforcement (in favor of Tuareg Malians). As a result, French peace enforcement will be less effective than UN peace enforcement. Table F1 summarizes the identity signals.

Hypotheses A1 and A2 address the positive effect of international peace enforcement while hypothesis A3 relates to the mediating effect of the identity of the peacekeeper.

Hypothesis A1 UN enforcement has a positive effect on interethnic trust relative to control.

Hypothesis A2 French international enforcement has a positive effect on interethnic trust relative to control.

Hypothesis A3 UN enforcement has a larger effect on interethnic trust relative to French enforcement.

Alternative Explanations for the Hypothesized Effect

An alternative explanation for greater trust with a UN enforcer might be that states in general, and not France specifically, might be associated with biased enforcement. This would suggest another mechanism than the one I propose. In this case, we would expect (1) the UN to do better than any other state enforcer and (2) France to do as well as other state enforcers. I test for this possibility using an endorsement experiment that includes the

United States as a placebo treatment. I also ask individuals directly about their opinions of international actors including the United States as a placebo.

Another alternative might be that participants believe that the UN has more localized resources at its disposal to enforce than foreign states do. In the treatments of the trust game, I control for this by telling each participant that each international actor is using the same amount of resources (two peacekeepers in another room of the building) to monitor.

Heterogenous Effects: Low Levels of Baseline Trust

I argue that international peace enforcement is at its most effective when levels of baseline trust are low. It is under these conditions that international enforcement is needed the most since members of two different ethnic groups will have little reason to trust each other. I test this hypothesis against the null that the treatment effect does not vary.

Hypothesis B Null The treatment effect of international peace enforcement on interethnic trust is homogenous across baseline levels of individual trust.

Hypothesis B1 The treatment effect of international peace enforcement is relatively higher for individuals that exhibit lower levels of baseline trust

I look at two factors that may decrease baseline levels of interethnic trust and, in so doing, increase the effectiveness of international peace enforcement: exposure to violence by Tuareg armed groups and relatively low exposure to Tuareg individuals.¹⁴

Victimization Leads to Lower Baseline Levels of Trust

Although conventional wisdom holds that civil war victimization has long-lasting, ill effects on individuals, an emerging scholarly consensus has developed that exposure to violence has no adverse effects on political behavior and, in some cases, may even positively benefit society. In a study of exposure to violence in Sierra Leone, [Bellows and Miguel \(2006\)](#) find that exposure to violence is associated with higher levels of voter registration, community meeting attendance, and higher group membership. In a related study, [Bellows and Miguel \(2009\)](#) use individual-level survey data from Sierra Leone to explore the connection between exposure to violence and political participation. They find that “individuals whose households directly experienced war violence are much more active political and civic participants than non-victims (p. 1145).” In his examination of child soldiers in Uganda, [Blattman \(2009\)](#) argues

¹⁴The test of this hypothesis is conditional upon finding a large enough number of individuals who have been exposed to violence in Bamako.

that former child soldiers who have been exposed to violence experience especial personal growth. His findings suggest that forced recruitment of child soldiers leads to greater postwar political participation, both in terms of voting as well as local political leadership.

Some recent work has supported these observational and quasi-experimental studies with lab-in-the-field experiments. [Voors et al. \(2012\)](#) find that “individuals who have either experienced violence themselves, or who live in communities that have been violently attacked, display more altruistic behavior, are more risk-seeking, and act less patiently (p. 943).” Through a set of games designed to examine cooperation and trust, [Gilligan et al. \(2014\)](#) find that violence is positively associated with pro-social behavior on an individual-level. They offer evidence for two potential mechanisms: (1) violence may cause individuals who are less social to simply leave their communities, leaving behind only pro-social individuals; and (2) violence has produced a certain level of communal solidarity in order to cope with the conflict.

I propose that the treatment effect of peace enforcement is conditional not simply on exposure to violence but rather on *who* perpetrates the violence against the individual. Specifically, I distinguish between in-group violence (committed by the Malian military) and out-group violence (committed by Tuareg rebels). As I explain in greater detail in the research strategy section, my study focuses on the behavior of non-Tuareg Malians, which is why I associate Tuareg rebel groups with an out-group.

Recent research on conflict has offered support for the idea that ethnic identity shapes how citizens perceive conflict actors. For instance, in their study on wartime support for combatants in Afghanistan, [Lyall et al. \(2013\)](#) find evidence that violence by one’s in-group does not reduce support for that in-group or increase support of an out-group. However, they also find evidence that violence by an out-group has the reverse effect: decreased support for the out-group and increased support for the in-group. Looking at Iraq, [Sambanis et al. \(2012\)](#) suggest that COIN operations can trigger parochial preferences among domestic populations by activating ethnic cleavages.

Non-Tuareg individuals that have been exposed to violence by Tuareg rebel groups are less likely to trust members of other ethnic groups and especially Tuareg Malians. The logic of this argument derives from Social Identity Theory, a prominent research program in the social psychology literature.¹⁵ Individuals, as social beings, become associated with several social identities—distinctions that categorize groups of individuals—such as Mande, Tuareg, Malian, Muslim, etc. In-group favoritism, when individuals systematically evaluate members of their ethnic group higher than others, may translate into choosing goods and services from, extending trust to, or cooperating exclusively with an in-group. For individuals exposed to violence by an out-group, in-group favoritism can serve many useful purposes. At the most basic, in-group favoritism can serve as a rudimentary yet invaluable survival technique, helping individuals minimize risk of defection during cooperation. [Brewer \(1999\)](#) explains

¹⁵See the work of Henri Tajfel and his colleagues ([Tajfel et al. 1971](#); [Tajfel and Turner 1979](#)).

this evolutionary dynamic well:

For long-term survival, we must be willing to rely on others for information, aid, and shared resources, and we must be willing to give information and aid and to share resources with others. At the individual level, the potential benefits (receiving resources from others) and costs (giving resources to others) of mutual cooperation go hand in hand and set natural limits on cooperative interdependence. The decision to cooperate (to expend resources to another's benefit) is a dilemma of trust since the ultimate benefits depend on everyone else's willingness to do the same. A cooperative system requires that trust dominate over distrust. But indiscriminate trust (or indiscriminate altruism) is not an effective individual strategy; altruism must be contingent on the probability that others will cooperate as well. Social differentiation and clear group boundaries provide one mechanism for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence without the risk of excessive costs. Ingroup membership is a form of contingent altruism. By limiting aid to mutually acknowledged ingroup members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained (p. 433).

When bullets become the currency of social interaction, violence serves as a blunt and obvious reminder for the members of non-Tuareg ethnic groups that the Tuareg with whom they are interacting—through conflict—are, in fact, an out-group. As a result, I suggest that baseline levels of interethnic trust will be comparatively lower for these individuals. Ergo, I hypothesize that international enforcement has a higher effect on these individuals compared to individuals who have not been exposed to violence:

Hypothesis B1a The treatment effect of international peace enforcement is positively associated with exposure to violence from non-co-ethnic groups

Lack of Interethnic Contact Leads to Lower Baseline Levels of Trust

The contact hypothesis suggests that under certain, “optimal” conditions, interaction between members of two different groups should lead to reduced prejudice.¹⁶ In the context of Malian interethnic relations, I expect individuals who have had more contact with Tuareg to be more trusting of Tuareg. Conversely, I expect Malians who have had relatively less contact with Tuareg individuals to possess a lower level of baseline interethnic trust. As a result, I hypothesize that the treatment effect of international peace enforcement will be relatively higher for individuals who have had less contact with Tuareg.

Hypothesis B1b The treatment effect of international peace enforcement is negatively associated with contact with Tuareg individuals.

¹⁶Amir (1969); Paluck and Green (2009).

Heterogenous Effects: Contact with International Actors

I also argue that the more Malian individuals interact with UN peacekeepers, the more likely they are to trust their enforcement capacity and trust that any potential interactions with Tuareg Malians would be policed. This is a specific application of the contact hypothesis. Although limited data exists about the interactions between civilians and peacekeepers, a couple of recent studies have shown that increased contact with the UN increases populations' perception of their effectiveness. In particular, ? finds that increasing exposure to UN patrols in Liberia strengthens perceptions of state authority. Also looking at the UN in Liberia, [Mvukiyehe and Samii \(2010\)](#) report that the deployment of UN bases spurs the growth of local markets.

Hypothesis C Null The treatment effect of international peace enforcement on interethnic trust is homogenous across individuals.

Hypothesis C1 The effect of UN peace enforcement on interethnic trust is positively associated with an individual's degree of contact with UN peacekeepers

Although it is likely that the same type of positive effect exists for contact with French soldiers and/or French individuals, it is possible that any such effect would be negated by the colonial legacy I outline in my theory. Although I will test for both possibilities in my study, I do not outline either formally in this pre-analysis plan.

Research Strategy

In order to test the above hypotheses, I will present empirical evidence drawing upon fieldwork to be conducted in Bamako, Mali that has four components:

1. Endorsement experiment
2. Baseline Survey
3. Trust game
4. Endline Survey

In this section, I describe the procedure that will be used to generate the sample. In this discussion, I also highlight how a sample from Bamako differs from a nationally representative sample and the measures I will use to correct for such differences. All four components of the research draw from the same sample. The next sections outline the research design for the endorsement experiment, the baseline (pre-treatment) survey questionnaire, the trust game, and the endline (post-treatment) questionnaire.




Figure F3: Mobilization for sample sites in Southern Bamako.

Sampling Procedure

Subjects will be recruited from 8 neighborhoods around the residential areas of southern Bamako. 15 sets of coordinates were randomly selected to serve as a locations (8 for the game, 4 for a pilot and pre-testing, and 3 as back-up). Enumerators will be instructed to find 70 individuals/day for 8 days for the main experiment in each of these sites. Although survey enumerators will not have a specific randomization protocol, they will be instructed to gather subjects from diverse backgrounds: central/peripheral residents, young/old, male/female. In order to maintain as representative of a sample as possible, no eligibility requirements will be placed on the residents with the exception that they must all be over 18 years of age and not Tuareg.¹⁷

¹⁷Since the game is based on Malians' perceptions of Tuareg individuals, I excluded all Tuareg from the sample.

Bamako vs. Mali

	Urban (prop.)	Electricity (prop.)	Water (prop.)	Sewage (prop.)	Employed (prop.)	Educ. (grade)	elf
Bamako	1.00	0.79	0.68	0.32	0.40	4.28	0.35
North							
Gao	0.21	0.09	0.17	0.03	0.39	0.98	0.70
Kidal	0.37	0.16	0.19	0.03	0.52	0.84	0.41
Tombouctou	0.13	0.11	0.19	0.02	0.49	0.69	0.76
Central							
Segou	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.06	0.47	1.22	0.55
Mopti	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.04	0.57	0.71	0.78
South							
Kayes	0.14	0.16	0.23	0.05	0.49	1.12	0.74
Koulikoro	0.05	0.15	0.12	0.06	0.47	1.59	0.47
Sikasso	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.07	0.49	1.22	0.68
All Urban areas	1.00	0.66	0.61	0.24	0.39	3.66	0.50
Mali (state)	0.25	0.20	0.21	0.07	0.48	1.40	0.60

Table F2: Comparing Bamako to Mali’s eight other regions according to seven metrics. Source: 2009 Malian census.

I chose Bamako as the setting for this study for three reasons. First, Bamako is the center of international peacekeeping operations. Subjects in any study will likely be familiar with MINUSMA, the UN Peacekeeping mission, and the role of the French military in Mali.¹⁸ As such, Bamako, as a setting, is likely to feature a high degree of internal validity. That is, given the awareness of international actors, the observed treatment effects are likely to operate as theorized. Second, since 2012, violence in northern and central Mali has forced internally displaced persons to take up residence in Bamako.¹⁹ Finally, the horrific attacks on the Radisson Blu in November 2015, the first of their kind since the June 2015 peace accords, have made the violence from the conflict salient once again.²⁰ These factors have combined to make Bamako one of the forced melting pots of Mali and one of the most active test cases of national reconciliation and peacebuilding in Mali.

¹⁸Survey questions following the trust game will assess this further.

¹⁹These people, though important members of daily life in Bamako are (obviously) not included in the official census numbers documented here.

²⁰This project will be implemented in February 2015, approximately three months following the attacks.

However, it is worth noting that Bamako differs a great deal from the rest of Mali. Bamako is much more developed and its residents have, on average, much greater access to public goods. Table F2 provides an idea of the ways in which Bamako differs from the rest of Mali, using data gathered from the official 2009 census. These differences notwithstanding, Bamako closely resembles all urban areas in Mali in its structural characteristics, which suggests that what differentiates Bamako is not idiosyncratic to Bamako itself but rather a manifestation of the urban/rural divide in Mali. I deal with this issue in two ways. First, I rely upon the sampling procedure to gather residents of peripheral areas of Bamako whose lives more closely resemble that of urban Malians. Second, I ask subjects whether they have lived in Bamako their whole lives or moved from a rural area in order to estimate a potential “rural spirit” conditional effect.

Research Design

Endorsement Experiment

I embed an endorsement experiment in the sampling questionnaire. Endorsement experiments are particularly useful in conflict and post-conflict settings where social desirability and fear of punishing for non-participation or non-response are present.

Endorsement experiments should satisfy three criteria²¹:

1. Participants should generally know about the initiative or proposal being endorsed to differentiate the endorsement effect from a learning effect
2. Participants should hold a variety of opinions about the initiative in order to avoid ceiling and floor effects
3. The endorsers should actually endorse the initiative in real life

I chose the most recent peace agreement (signed in June 2015) as the proposed initiative in order to satisfy these criteria. After the endorsement experiment, I ask individuals a question about their familiarity with the agreement to assess the general level of awareness. Existing studies suggest that Malians hold a variety of opinions about the agreement. Finally, all three proposed endorsers—the UN, France, and the United States—do endorse the initiative in real life.

The treatments and control are randomly assigned independently of the treatment conditions of the trust game. In the control condition, the respondents receive the following text:

²¹Lyall et al. (2013).

In June 2015, the Malian government signed the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation with Tuareg rebel groups fighting the Malian military in the North. How do you feel about this agreement?

1. I strongly approve of the agreement
2. I approve of the agreement
3. I neither approve nor disapprove of the agreement
4. I disapprove of the agreement
5. I strongly disapprove of the agreement
6. I don't know

If the subjects receive one of the treatment conditions, they receive a variation of the following text:

In June 2015, the Malian government signed the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation with Tuareg rebel groups fighting the Malian military in the North. [**The United Nations OR France OR The United States**] **strongly supports the agreement.** How do you feel about this agreement?

1. I strongly approve of the agreement
2. I approve of the agreement
3. I neither approve nor disapprove of the agreement
4. I disapprove of the agreement
5. I strongly disapprove of the agreement
6. I don't know

Pre-Treatment Survey Questions

In addition to the contributions from the trust game, I also look at respondents' answers to a variety of survey questions.

Exposure to Violence

I use subjects' answers to the following questions to categorize them into different groups according to their exposure to violence. Specifically, I ask individuals whether they or a member of their household has been exposed to violence by Tuareg armed groups.

Perceptions of International Actors

In order to further test my main hypotheses about individuals' views of the bias of international actors, I gauge their perceptions of international actors directly through survey questions and indirectly through an endorsement experiment. In addition to France and the United Nations, I use the United States as a placebo in these questions. If my theory holds, I would expect to see the United States evaluated in between France and the United Nations in terms of perception of bias. Next, I ask individuals general questions about their perception of trust of peacekeepers from different international actors:

Contact Hypothesis

I ask two sets of questions related to the contact hypothesis: (1) questions about interactions with Tuareg Malians and (2) questions about interactions with UN peacekeepers. I derive the survey questions for subjects related to Tuareg Malians from the psychology literature related to contact between white and black Americans.²²

Trust Game

Basic Protocol

In order to test my hypotheses, I propose a traditional trust game played with non-Tuareg Malians from different ethnic groups that constitute the majority of Mali's population: Bambara, Malinke, Soninke, Fulani, Songhai, Dogon, and Bozo.²³

Each subject plays two rounds of the game. Each round of the game proceeds as follows:

1. Subjects receive 1,000 francs in an envelope to send to another participant.²⁴
2. Each subject is shown a picture of a Tuareg man, told his name, and told that the participant is Tuareg in order to make sure that the subjects understand that they are playing with a non-coethnic, Tuareg. Although subjects are told that the other participant is human, the other participant's behavior is programmed in advanced in order to control for the behavior and identity of the other participant.

²²See, for example, [Sigelman and Welch \(1993\)](#).

²³This is not a complete list of ethnic groups in Mali, merely a listing of the largest ethnic groups. The Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke ethnic groups constitute the Mande ethnic group in Mali.

²⁴An alternative research design could have subjects play the trust game on a laptop or tablet using software such as ZTree. However, given the low literacy levels and low levels of familiarity with computers, I chose this envelope-based approach to maximize comprehension and internal validity.

3. Subjects decide how much of their initial allotment to send (I call this amount y). They are told that however much they choose to send to their Tuareg partners will be multiplied by 2 for a maximum of 2,000 francs. However, they are also told that the other participant will keep between 0 and 2,000 francs for themselves and send back the remainder.
4. Subjects collect the remainder.

Variable	description	min	max
y	initial contribution	0	1000
$2y$	doubled contribution	0	2000
x	Tuareg self-allotment	0	2000
$2y - x$	Remainder sent back	0	2000

Table F3: List of possible contributions in game.

Survey enumerators explain the rules to each participant in a brief training session before the actual playing of the game to ensure full comprehension. The enumerator then hands the individual the envelope with the 1,000 francs and leaves them in a private room to make the decision. After the subject has decided upon their contribution, the enumerator returns to the room to collect the envelope. The survey enumerators leave the room and return with the contributions from the phantom, Tuareg player. This concludes the round of play and the next round begins with another envelope.

Treatment

Before the first round of the game, subjects are randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions: control (no enforcement), UN enforcement, French enforcement. In the control condition, subjects receive no additional information. Subjects keep their assignment for the remainder of the game. In the enforcement treatment conditions, subjects receive the following information after seeing the photo of the Tuareg man and before they choose how much of the initial allotment to send:

2 peacekeepers from [the United Nations OR France] are in another room of this building to monitor how much you and your partner send to each other. They will look to see how much you send to each other in the envelope. If the peacekeepers believe that one of you is not being generous enough, they will impose a fine on the individual who is not being generous.

I use no enforcement as the control rather than an alternative treatment that tells subjects that Malian authorities are monitoring their contributions because this more closely resembles the reality of interethnic interactions in Mali. Lack of capacity precludes the availability of Malian policing of interethnic relations. And so, the relevant control comparison group is one in which subjects do not expect any external enforcement. The alternative—telling subjects about a Malian authority—would provide an unrealistic comparison group.

Non-Interference

I undertake several measures in order to minimize spillover between units. All subjects who play the game in a single day wait in an initial holding room. When a subject's turn to play comes, an enumerator leads them to private room where they have no contact with other players. When finished with the game, they leave through an exit that has no contact with subjects that have not played or the holding room.

Post-Treatment Survey Questions

I end the experiment by asking individuals questions about their opinion of their treatment by the enforcer in the game if they were assigned to an enforcement treatment conditions. I also ask individuals why they chose to make the contributions that they made in order to provide additional, open-ended verification my hypothesized mechanism

Empirical Analyses

In order to test my hypotheses, I will conduct a series of OLS regressions with variable indicators for the three different treatments and then indicators for each condition of interest for the heterogenous effects (exposure to violence, contact with Tuareg, contact with UN).


Balance Tests

I will conduct balance tests across the three treatment groups on the following variables:

- Age
- Sex
- Maternal language

- Region of birth
- Education level
- Number of children
- Contact with Tuareg
- Contact with UN
- Exposure to state violence
- Exposure to rebel violence

Power Analysis and Sample Size



(a) Estimating power of UN treatment

(b) Estimating power of France treatment

Figure F4: Power calculations for the average treatment effect of the two treatments. Number indicates minimum size of sample required to generate conventional power levels.

I conducted a simulation-based power analysis assuming that the average contribution under control in round 1 was 600 francs with a standard deviation of 150.²⁵ I assume that assignment to the UN as an enforcer would increase contributions by 100 francs. Using 1000 simulations, I estimated that at least 80 subjects would be needed to generate enough

²⁵All assumptions of contributions and treatment effects were made based upon similar studies. See [Mironova and Whitt \(2015\)](#).

power ($\beta \geq 0.80$) to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels ($\alpha < 0.05$) for the hypothesized average treatment effect for the France. I assume that assignment to the France as an enforcer would increase contributions by 50 francs, half of the UN effect. Using 1000 simulations, I estimated that at least 290 subjects would be needed to generate enough power ($\beta \geq 0.80$) to achieve statistical significance at $p < 0.05$ and at least 225 subjects to achieve statistical significance at $p < 0.10$.

Based off of these calculations, I allocated 100 subjects for the control group, 200 for the UN enforcement treatment condition, and 200 for the France enforcement condition. Comparison between France and the UN may be underpowered. However, this set up will generate enough power to compare the effect of any international enforcement (either France or the UN) to control (no enforcement).

F.2 Discussion of Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan

In this section, I discuss in detail all of the deviations from the pre-analysis plan (PAP).

1. Terminology for dependent variable—throughout the PAP, I refer to the dependent variable as “interethnic trust.” Although it is a minor detail, in the manuscript, I have revised this to intergroup cooperation for clarity. None of the analyses are impacted by this stylistic choice.
2. Null and sharp null hypotheses—I do not formally state these hypotheses in the manuscript. However, I do make it clear for the reader that these are the hypotheses that I seek to reject. None of the analyses are impacted by this stylistic choice.
3. Hypothesis parsimony—I combine Hypothesis A1 and A2 from the PAP into a single hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) for parsimony. None of the analyses are impacted by this stylistic choice. For transparency, I consider a brief analysis retaining these hypotheses. The results from the experiment suggest that we reject the null in favor of A1 but fail to reject the null in favor of A2.
4. Hypothesis A3 rephrasing—I changed the wording of Hypothesis A3 into a more general version (“French enforcement” becomes “peace enforcers from single countries.” None of the analyses are impacted by this stylistic choice.
5. Exposure to violence—I did not include an analysis of individuals that had been victimized because not enough participants stated that they had been exposed to violence, either to fear or due to not being victimized. Since I did not know ex ante that this would be an issue, I included in the PAP.
6. Cluster randomization—Because of electricity issues that arose during field implementation, I was unable to individual randomize the treatment, resulting in the cluster randomization procedure discussed in the manuscript but not in the PAP. In order to recover (some) of the efficiency losses, I include cluster fixed effects and robust, clustered standard errors. Because I did not know ex ante that this issue would arise in the field, I did not include in the PAP. Although it merely affects the precision not substantive magnitude of the treatment (Gerber and Green 2012).

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